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UPĀYA-KAUŚALYA AS THE PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATION OF MADHYAMAKA 
ETHICAL CLAIMS 
 
Madhyamaka Buddhism is typically characterized as a particularly thoroughgoing form 
of anti-foundationalism. This leads to difficulties when trying to justify knowledge claims as 
well as ethical claims, especially in the light of how these claims are handled in mainstream 
Abhidharma Buddhism. The ethical domain is particularly important for Buddhism since the 
Buddhist project is fundamentally soteriological. I endeavor to offer a plausible way that truth 
claims, especially ethical truth claims, can be justified while keeping to Madhyamaka’s 
metaphysical commitments. Specifically, I will argue that a functional-pragmatist approach – I 
use the term upāya-kauśalya or “skillful means” – is the most promising way that Madhyamaka 
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The Buddhist philosophical position is united by a set of shared commitments regarding 
the ubiquity of suffering or discontent (duḥkha), the causes for this suffering, the way to 
eliminate this suffering, and the way that our understanding of, and approach to, reality 
facilitates or obstructs this elimination.1 Different schools and thinkers may interpret these 
commitments in vastly different ways making for a rich and varied philosophical tradition that 
has continued since the time of the Buddha in sixth century BCE India. In the second century CE 
the scholar and monk Nāgārjuna established a position that came to be known as Madhyamaka, 
notable for the assertion of universal emptiness (śūnyatā). Although this will be detailed later on 
this assertion essentially amounts to the claim that no phenomena whatsoever possesses an 
intrinsic nature (svabhāva). This has led modern interpreters to conceptualize Madhyamaka as a 
form of anti-foundationalism or anti-realism (though these may be problematic 
characterizations). Typically, anti-foundational positions face problems when justifying 
knowledge claims as they cannot make appeals to foundational claims and Madhyamaka is no 
different in this respect. Moreover, the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths, conventional and 
ultimate (this will be detailed later on), takes on a particular meaning within Madhyamaka that 
makes the justification of knowledge claims even more troublesome.  
Since the Buddhist project is fundamentally a soteriological enterprise concerned with the 
freedom from suffering many of the claims made within Buddhism relate to what one should do 
to help bring about that state. This gives the entire Buddhist project an ethical flavor whereby 
one’s actions, in one way or another, make a difference to the basic goals of Buddhism. Truth 
and falsity play an important role in the elimination of suffering because it is through one’s 
                                                
1 This is not an exhaustive list. 
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benighted state that suffering arises. Buddhists hold that the primitive root of suffering is 
ignorance about the way things really are; yet the characterization of how things really are may 
vary from thinker to thinker. Nevertheless, correcting one’s view is a necessary condition for 
eliminating suffering and achieving awakening – essentially the permanent removal of the 
benighted state that leads to perpetual suffering. In this manner, the strongly ethical claims of 
Buddhism are characterized as ethical truths. For many types of Buddhism the normative weight 
of these truths comes from their connection to the particular type of metaphysical outlook that 
they hold. That is, one should do x because doing x reflects the fact that the world is 
fundamentally y, and action based on the knowledge of y is that which will lead to awakening. 
So there is a tight connection between the knowledge of the way things really are and the goal of 
awakening. However, if ethical truth is a subset of truth, then not only does Madhyamaka face 
trouble in epistemic justification but also in ethical justification. And since the ethical and 
soteriological component is so deeply a part of the Buddhist project, Madhyamaka seems to be in 
need of a way to justify their ethical claims otherwise a core part of the Buddhist project is in 
danger of being undermined.  
This is not a new problem for the Mādhyamika,2 since Nāgārjuna’s time many opponents, 
both Buddhist and not, rejected Madhyamaka as a form of nihilism. Contemporary efforts to 
explicate the Madhyamaka position in a non-nihilist manner face the same issue of justification 
in both epistemology and ethics. In what follows I endeavor to offer a plausible way to 
understand truth in Madhyamaka, particularly ethical truth, given the particular philosophical 
commitments of the Mādhyamika. My postulation is that Madhyamaka can offer a plausible 
justification of their ethical claims by appealing to the practical efficacy of these claims in 
                                                
2 Following contemporary convention I will refer to the philosophical position as “Madhyamaka” and an 
adherent of this position as a “Mādhyamika”. 
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bringing about the goals particular to Buddhism. I refer to this by use of another Buddhist term, 
upāya-kauśalya3 or skillful means. In essence, the Mādhyamika can offer a sort of pragmatic 
justification for their ethical claims because these ethical claims, and the actions they prescribe, 
are particularly effective means of achieving progress on the path to awakening.  
The first chapter will explicate the Madhyamaka position and other central concepts 
necessary to understand the broad and narrow justification problems it faces. Much of this 
involves the Abhidharma position that Madhyamaka contrasts with; as such I will present 
Abhidharma as a foil to highlight the particularities of certain Madhyamaka assertions. Since my 
concern is for the ethical claims made in Madhyamaka and this is directly related to the actions 
one takes, I examine agency in chapter two. My goal there is twofold, first to understand what 
notion of agency there could be in Buddhism (particularly Abhidharma and Madhyamaka) given 
particular Buddhist doctrines. Secondly, to tentatively examine how the notion of skillful means 
could operate in assertions of autonomous agency. In the final chapter I offer my approach to 
understanding truth, particularly ethical truth, within Madhyamaka. I consider ethical truth to be 
a subset of truth generally and as such the justification of both types of claim are similar. My 
proposal is broadly pragmatic and functional in nature, but specifically oriented according to the 
structure of the Buddhist path to awakening. However, this approach is restricted to the 
framework of Buddhism and does not offer incentive to those outside of the Buddhist 
framework. That is, a functional or pragmatist epistemology does not lead one to a particular 
ethical view, as multiple views are plausible on this account, so one may ask “Why Buddhism?” 
I again draw on resources from within and without Buddhism to answer this objection in a 
                                                
3 I will generally use upāya for short when referring to skillful means, although upāya technically translates 
to “means” only and kuśala to skillful (when combined kuśala becomes kauśalya). 
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manner that keeps to the commitments of the Madhyamaka position, but is not necessarily one 







Madhyamaka emerged as one of two major schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India 
during the second and third centuries CE primarily through the works of the scholar monk 
Nāgārjuna. His articulation of the Madhyamaka position is characterized by the assertion of 
śūnyatā or emptiness. Although Madhyamaka is not the only branch of Buddhism to emphasize 
this concept, their interpretation and implementation of the concept is unique. What this amounts 
to may be described in contemporary terms as a form of anti-foundationalism or anti-realism, 
one that invited criticism from many of their contemporaries, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike. 
This criticism is reasonable given that their position seems to generate a host of problems 
regarding metaphysics, truth, and language. Broadly, this problem concerns any truth claim made 
within an anti-realist or anti-foundationalist framework, although what primarily concerns me are 
ethical claims. The ethical domain is particularly important as the Buddhist project is 
characterized by a number of ethical claims, which, if subject to this broad problem, seem to be 
in danger of being undermined. In what follows I will articulate and motivate this broad problem 
for Madhyamaka by first explaining the context to which Madhyamaka may be seen as a 
reaction. This involves canvassing the earlier Abhidharma philosophical position as well as a 
foray through certain pan-Buddhist concepts, specifically those regarding truth and ontology. 
Once the Madhyamaka position is articulated and explained in this light the broad problem 
described above should start to materialize. Furthermore, since the Buddhist project places 
specific importance on ethical themes I will motivate the particularly ethical problem that the 
Mādhyamika faces. Finally, I will offer a suggestion for situating these ethical claims within the 
Madhyamaka framework through the expansion of another Buddhist concept – upāya-kauśalya 
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or “skillful means”. I then tentatively examine upāya to see whether it may serve as a plausible 
candidate for the task at hand.  
1.1 Abhidharma Background.  
The teachings of the Buddha were preserved orally in the years that followed his death 
sometime in the fifth century BCE. The earliest written records of these teachings constitute the 
Pāli Canon, the scriptural basis for the earliest forms of Buddhism. The Pāli Canon is divided 
into three “baskets” or pitakas (referring to the vessels that contained the palm leaf manuscripts 
upon which the teachings were written). The three pitakas are: the Vinaya Pitaka, concerning 
rules and regulations regarding the monastic community and their practices, the Sutta Pitaka, the 
recorded discourses and sermons of the Buddha, and the Abhidhamma Pitaka, works that 
elaborate upon various Buddhist doctrines in a more systematic and philosophical manner. 
Abhidharma4 as a philosophical orientation includes that which is outlined in the Abhidhamma 
Pitaka but also refers to the philosophical position(s) of the various schools of early Buddhism, 
and as such may not necessarily reflect one specific sub-school of Buddhism.5 Abhidharma, then, 
is the first systematic explication of Buddhist philosophy, one that impacted future Buddhist 
thought and engendered Buddhist philosophy as distinct enterprise. 
1.1.1 Two Truths. 
 The conceptual distinction between ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) and conventional 
truth (saṃvṛtisatya) is one that first appeared in this early Buddhist philosophical literature. This 
division of truth permeates much of Buddhist philosophy with different schools defined (in part) 
                                                
4 “Abhidharma” is Sanskrit and “Abhidhamma” is Pāli. Both mean something like “concerning the 
teachings”. Noa Ronkin. “Abhidharma”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2017 ed. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abhidharma/.  
 
5 At least eighteen various schools of Abhidharma Buddhism are believed to have been operating during 
this early phase, of which Theravāda is the only remaining still practiced today. These are notably not Mahāyāna 
schools of Buddhism and represent the Buddhist landscape out of which Mahāyāna arose. 
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by how they understood the difference as well as the relation between ultimate and conventional 
truth. It is unclear whether the Buddha explicitly gave this particular characterization, but it 
seemed to develop out of another pair of terms: nītārtha, statements whose meaning is definitive, 
and neyārtha, statements whose meaning requires interpretation6. This distinction was originally 
a hermeneutical device to draw out the meaning of various teachings that seemed to be in 
conflict with each other. However, this distinction developed into the more robust concept of the 
two truths, which had resulting effects for metaphysics, semantics, and epistemology. Moreover, 
the Sanskrit terms for conventional truth saṃvṛtisatya, and ultimate truth paramārthasatya share 
the suffix satya, which means “truth”. However, the term sat also encompasses reality, as in 
saṃvṛtisat and paramārthasat, which would then mean conventional reality and ultimate reality 
respectively. The relation between sat and satya will become more important later on, but at this 
point it is important to note that there is a distinction between conventional and ultimate truth.  
Asserting this bifurcation of truth or reality as a way to reconcile apparently conflicting 
remarks made by the Buddha does not tell us to what exactly this distinction amounts. What 
constitutes the two truths in early Buddhism is indicated by The Cowherds through a reference to 
a passage in the commentary on the Kathāvatthu of the Abhidhamma Pitaka,  
The Enlightened One, the best of all teachers, propounded two truths, conventional and 
ultimate; we do not see a third. A statement governed [purely] by agreement is true 
because of the world’s conventions, and an ultimate statement is true in that it 
characterizes things as they are.7 
 
The conventional is simply understood as the “normal” world that we interact with and maneuver 
through, complete with the attendant truths that hold in it. This characterization importantly 
includes a transactional nature, which hinges on how conventional reality is constituted by (in a 
                                                
6 Cowherds, Moonshadows Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 5. 
 
7 Cowherds Moonshadows, 6.  
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non-tautological sense) conventions. A useful analogy here is to traffic laws. There is no real 
principled reason why US drivers and UK drivers travel on different sides of the road but as long 
as all participants within each respective system adhere to convention then collisions are averted 
and motorists arrive at their destinations. However, the notion of agreement in conventional 
reality may run deeper than traffic laws; the (perhaps naïvely held) notions of the world as 
permanent, substantial, and enduring are included in conventional truth, but these notions 
(insofar as they are accepted by a vast majority of people) provide a shared and somewhat useful 
framework in which to carry out one’s affairs.   
The particular characterization of ultimate truth above indicates that there is a way things 
are that is more foundational than the conventional. Moreover, this characterization of ultimate 
truth as describing “the way things are” correlates to yathā-bhutam-darśanam, the Sanskrit term 
for “seeing things as they are”, which is said to be a characteristic of awakened beings because 
they see the ultimate nature of reality. Richard Hayes’s explanation of the doctrine of the two 
truths states similarly,  
According to this doctrine there is a level of understanding that consists of an accurate 
account of the world as it is experienced in everyday life [conventional] and another level 
of understanding that is conducive to reaching the ultimate goal … of Buddhist practice, 
namely, nirvāṇa [or awakening]…8  
 
Again, the conventional is characterized as the realm of our everyday lives, but this description 
of the ultimate as that which facilitates the goal of awakening is worth noting. The Sanskrit term 
for ultimate truth, paramārthasatya, breaks down into paraṃ, “highest” or “supreme” and ārtha, 
which can mean “meaning”, “referent”, or “goal” (as mentioned previously, satya means 
“truth”). The translation of paramārthasatya into ultimate truth is reasonable yet the semantic 
range of ārtha indicates that “truth of the highest meaning” or “truth of the highest goal” would 
                                                
8 Hayes, “Madhyamaka”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2017 ed. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/madhyamaka/>. 
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serve as well. These overlapping translations capture the notion that ultimate truth is constitutive 
towards the fundamental goal in Buddhism. Moreover, the connection between ultimate truth as 
a goal, and the understanding of ultimate truth as a perception of “the way things are”, point 
towards the particularly Buddhist approach to soteriology, which runs throughout Buddhist 
philosophy. 
 The Buddhist project is fundamentally about the liberation from suffering9. The Four 
Noble Truths, foundational in all forms of Buddhism, exemplify this by asserting: 1) duḥkha, the 
pervasive presence of suffering 2) samudaya, the origin of suffering, 3) nirodha, that suffering 
can cease, and 4) marga, the path to the cessation of suffering. In addition, Buddhism describes 
suffering as having three roots: greed, hatred, and ignorance. Of these, ignorance is seen as more 
primitive than the other two because it is thought that through one’s faulty view (of the way that 
things really are) that one resorts to greed and hatred in one’s interactions with the world. If one 
had the correct view on the nature of the world then the grasping or rejection of various 
phenomena would cease and one would have severed the sources of suffering at the roots. The 
view mentioned here is akin to a metaphysical understanding of the world, but this idea need not 
be abstract. For an analogous example, if one mistakenly thinks that a diet of candy and soda has 
all the necessary nutrients for a healthy body then this error will lead the person into suffering 
when their body begins to fail. The Buddha’s assertion of the Four Noble Truths is much like a 
physician diagnosing a problem and prescribing a treatment. Suffering, in all its manifold forms, 
is the diagnosis, and part of the treatment involves a fundamental shift in how we view the world 
and ourselves. For the Buddhist, metaphysical investigation is not simply philosophizing for its 
                                                
9 The Sanskrit term duḥkha is only partially captured by the term “suffering”. Generally this includes not 
only gross forms of suffering such as bodily or mental harm, but also more subtle and existential forms of unease or 
dissatisfaction. An apt way of characterizing this used in Buddhist teachings refers to the hub of a wheel that is 
misshapen or disjointed. When a cart or chariot is rolling along with a wheel whose hub is misshapen then the ride is 
characterized by repeated and regular bumps.  
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own sake, but a necessary component in correcting one’s outlook so as to reduce the suffering 
that necessarily results from a false view. In this way Buddhist metaphysics is fundamentally 
revisionary because it asserts that the naïvely held conception of the world is wrong insofar as it 
inevitably leads to suffering. 
When ultimate truth is described as conducive to reaching awakening the implication is 
that whatever ultimate truth actually is will be the metaphysical view that benefits those that hold 
it according to this Buddhist metric. In keeping to the teachings of the Buddha, Ābhidharmikas 
developed their philosophical positions using Buddhist doctrine as a starting point. The Buddha 
taught that three marks or aspects characterize all conditioned existence. These are 1) duḥkha or 
suffering, 2) anātman or non-self, and 3) anitya or impermanence. This characterization of 
specifically conditioned existence indicates another core Buddhist doctrine, pratītyasamutpāda 
or dependent origination, which holds that all phenomena arise as a result of causes and 
conditions10. Asserting that all phenomena arise from some set of causes and conditions is meant 
to indicate that any given entity does not possess its own substantial existence. This is what non-
self means as there is no substantial or essential core of the entity responsible for its existence. In 
this way dependent origination and selflessness can be seen as mutually implicating. Regarding 
this development of Abhidharma thought Waldron states,  
The [Ābhidharmikas] took the early Buddhist idea that the beings and things of the world 
are impermanent, selfless, and dependently arisen and extrapolated it to apply to all 
phenomena whatsoever. They argued that referring to anything in terms of entities or 
wholes (e.g. tables, persons, or even thoughts) is merely a conventional way of 
designating continuing yet provisional collocations of simpler more fundamental 
elements or factors, which alone could be said to truly exist.11  
                                                
10 This distinction is not paramount for my purposes here but the idea in specifying conditioned existence is 
to contrast with a type of existence that is unconditioned. Unconditioned existence, namely nirvāṇa, is not described 
by these three marks and is not subject to causes and conditions.  
 
11 William Waldron. The Buddhist Unconscious: The ālaya-vijñāna in the context of Indian Buddhist 
thought. (New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 50. 
 11 
The simpler and more fundamental elements that constitute composite phenomena Waldron 
alludes to are known as dharmas. 
 1.1.2 Dharma Theory 
A dharma is an absolutely simple, particularized, and momentary quality instantiation, 
somewhat similar to a trope in contemporary metaphysics. These are atomic in the strict sense as 
there is no conceivable divisibility within them, such that a dharma cannot even possess both 
shape and size.12 Furthermore, in reducing our experiential reality to these momentary units 
dharmas can be either physical or mental. Carpenter states,  
Dharmas are elements in that anything else that is real is ultimately composed of them. 
They are substances in the sense that they are genuine individuals, with a distinct identity. 
They are also that which ‘underlies’ reality in that anything real is constituted by 
dharmas; but they cannot be substances in the sense of bearers of properties. They are 
their (respective) properties.13 
 
This indicates a number of things worth mentioning. Composite entities, which encompass all 
phenomena we interact with, are constituted by dharmas. This points to the Abhidharma 
distinction between ultimate and conventional truth/reality. If something can be analyzed into its 
component parts then that entity is not ultimately real. However, that entity is still conventionally 
real because it is constituted by ultimately real dharmas. It is in virtue of these dharmas that 
composite entities have any status ontologically, albeit derived. There is then a clear sense of the 
ontological priority of dharmas, and the ultimate, over conventional reality populated by 
composite wholes.  
 Take some composite entity, following classical Buddhist fashion we will use a chariot. 
This is a complex whole made up of wheels, yoke, pole, etc. so clearly the chariot is only 
conventionally real. Moreover, each of these parts in turn can be analyzed into constituent parts 
                                                




as well with the wheel reducible to spokes, rim, hub etc. The end result of this type of analysis 
leads us to the dharmas of each component part, with each quality of the part accounted for by a 
corresponding dharma. Moreover, since dharmas are momentary there must be some relation 
that allows the quality to be identifiable conventionally. Dharmas are momentary events but ones 
that are causally produced and causally produce more dharmas. For some particular quality of, 
say the spoke, there is a casually continuous ‘stream’ of dharmas that corresponds to that quality. 
So the firmness of the spoke is understood to be the result of a momentary ‘flash’ of firmness 
that causally produces14 another ‘flash’ of firmness and so on such that we can conventionally 
identify the wheel spoke as something firm. If something were to occur that stopped the wheel 
from being firm, perhaps combustion, then this would be an interruption of the stream of 
dharmas such that the firmness ceased to be causally produced. This type of analysis underlies 
all phenomena for the Ābhidharmika and demonstrates their penchant for ontological 
reductionism.   
1.1.3 Svabhāva   
What of this description of dharmas as ‘genuine individuals’, mentioned above? This 
attribution points towards an important concept underlying Abhidharma philosophy, and the 
Madhyamaka critique of it. This quality of a dharma is known as svabhāva. Svabhāva, like many 
Sanskrit terms, does not find a simple translation into English. The term can be divided into sva, 
meaning “own” and bhāva, meaning “being” so a literal translation would be “own-being”, but it 
has been variously translated as “intrinsic nature”, “independent nature”, “essence”, or 
“substance”. None of these fully capture the notion of svabhāva but may indicate some 
understanding of what the term covers. In addition, svabhāva is typically contrasted with another 
                                                
14 Different Abhidharma schools had different conceptions and on the perplexing problem regarding causal 
efficacy of momentary entities. The differences among these approaches are interesting but unnecessary for my 
purposes here.  
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term parabhāva, which literally means “other-being”. Westerhoff rightly points out a particularly 
thorny problem in explaining svabhāva,  
[This problem] consists in presenting a clear explanation of a concept which is taken to 
be vacuous and in fact, if clearly examined, inconsistent. When one is looking at the 
Madhyamaka arguments, it is often quite hard to attribute anything like a defensible 
philosophical theory to the proponents of svabhāva at all, since these often appear to be 
conveniently set up straw men.1516 
 
In light of this I will follow Westerhoff’s analysis of svabhāva (albeit in much truncated form) as 
comprising three dimensions: ontological, cognitive, and semantic, although I am primarily 
concerned with the first two dimensions here. By canvassing these dimensions I hope to give a 
clear account of what a proponent of svabhāva is actually asserting, and why this may be a 
philosophically defensible position.17 
Later Madhyamaka arguments were primarily directed towards the ontological aspect of 
svabhāva, but there are two further distinctions18 that can be made within this dimension, 
svabhāva as essence and svabhāva as substance. Svabhāva as essence (or as Westerhoff calls it 
essence-svabhāva) concerns the specific characterizing property of an object.19 That is, the 
property that an object must have if it is to remain that particular object. If the object were to lose 
this property then it would cease to be the object in question. For example, fire may be 
characterized as essentially hot. In the event that fire ceased being hot, it would cease to be fire 
                                                
15 Jan Christoph Westerhoff. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 19-20. 
 
16 See also Richard Robinson’s “Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views?,” Philosophy East 
and West, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 1972): 325-331. 
 
17 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s, 20. 
 
18 Westerhoff identifies a third, absolute-svabhāva, but this is found entirely in the commentarial literature 
and, though interesting, does not serve my purposes here. 
 
19 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s, 21. 
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as we understand it. It is this attribution that gives dharmas their “genuine individuality” 
Carpenter mentions above.  
The prime target of the Madhyamaka critique is on svabhāva as an ontologically basic 
substance of sorts. Whereas essence-svabhāva serves epistemological ends in defining and 
individuating certain objects, substance-svabhāva serves to demarcate those that have dravyasat, 
or primary existence and those that have prajñaptisat, or conceptual existence. This neatly maps 
onto the distinction between ultimate and conventional reality indicating that only those with 
substance-svabhāva are ultimately real and primary, with everything else being conventionally 
real and secondary. The contrasting term parabhāva here would describe entities that make up 
conventional or secondary reality. In this manner the world is metaphysically split into a 
secondary realm made up of conventional and composite objects, each of which can be reduced 
to their primary and ultimate parts – dharmas – that alone possess substance-svabhāva. It is in 
virtue of substance-svabhāva that dharmas possess their primary ontological status over 
composite and complex objects, which themselves possess only parabhāva because their being is 
derived from these more basic dharmas. Westerhoff characterizes this ontological understanding 
of svabhāva thusly,  
…svabhāva is equated with primary existence and denotes a specific ontological status: 
to exist with svabhāva means to be part of the basic furniture of the world, independent 
of anything else that also happens to exist. Such objects provide the ontological rock-
bottom on which the diverse world of phenomena rests.20  
 
This independence condition is somewhat stronger than the position adopted by Abhidharma 
thinkers. Recall, the dharmas of ultimate reality are subject to causation and in this way they 
may be understood as dependently arisen. In this manner, dharmas are not totally independent of 
                                                
20 Jan Christoph Westerhoff. “Nāgārjuna” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2017 ed. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/nagarjuna/. 
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other dharmas, but may be understood as independent of any conventional entity21. If this is the 
case for the Ābhidharmika then the Madhyamaka critique, as it especially pertains to this notion, 
will have a certain amount of traction.   
 The cognitive aspect of svabhāva points back to the idea of metaphysics as a 
fundamentally soteriological enterprise for Buddhist philosophy. The idea is that when one has 
grasped the correct metaphysical situation of svabhāva (or for the Madhyamaka, the absence of 
it) then one not only has a theoretically satisfactory understanding of the world, but one is that 
much closer to the cognitive state of an awakened being. The cessation of ignorance as a root of 
suffering is in part achieved through the correct understanding of the two-fold nature of reality 
and its substance-svabhāva foundation. For the uninitiated non-Buddhist everyday objects are 
incorrectly attributed with svabhāva insofar as they are taken to be substantially real and 
enduring, existing independently of beings like us. This is simply the reification of conventional 
reality. The Ābhidharmika position views this as ignorance insofar as the attribution of svabhāva 
is in the wrong place, at the conventional instead of the ultimate level. The cognitive shift for the 
Ābhidharmika is when one no longer reifies composite objects, but sees them as fundamentally 
“empty” of svabhāva because this is only something that exists at the ultimate level of analysis. 
For the Ābhidharmika considering the ultimate reality of momentary dharmas possessing 
svabhāva is a way to undermine the roots of suffering that grow from an incorrect and ignorant 
way of conceptualizing the world. Svabhāva is not discarded but carefully situated within a 
larger metaphysical picture as an ontologically foundational property.  
1.2 Madhyamaka Critique. 
 The primary philosophical conviction of Madhyamaka is śūnyatā or emptiness. To be 
empty necessitates the question of what something is empty of, and for the Mādhyamika this is 
                                                
21 See Westerhoff’s, Nāgārjuna’s. 24-26. 
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svabhāva, which is why the core Madhyamaka doctrine is also known as svabhāva-śūnyatā. 
Asserting emptiness is not exclusive to Madhyamaka, as Abhidharma holds that conventional 
reality is empty of svabhāva as well, but for Madhyamaka this denial is thoroughgoing and 
applies to conventional and ultimate alike. Nāgārjuna, the second century monk attributed as the 
founder of Madhyamaka, makes a number of arguments rejecting the ontological notion of 
substance-svabhāva as incoherent or inconsistent. This philosophical approach carries into the 
Madhyamaka understanding of the relation between ontology and truth.   
1.2.1 Rejection of Svabhāva  
 Substance-svabhāva is understood to be the end-point in a series of dependency relations, 
and it is this notion that is rejected by Nāgārjuna. Three types of dependency concern 
Madhyamaka in their critique, mereological (the dependence of a composite object upon its 
parts), causal (dependence of an effect on its cause), and conceptual (the dependence of an object 
on a conceptualizing mind).22 Insofar as some object exhibits any of these types of dependency 
then that object cannot exist independently or be “established from its own side” as later Tibetan 
commentators phrased it. If something cannot be established in this manner then that object is 
taken to be empty of svabhāva. So if something can be shown to depend upon its parts, causes 
and conditions, or on a conceptualizing mind then that object is empty. This insistence on 
emptiness may be seen as pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) taken to its logical 
conclusion. Nāgārjuna states in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā or The Fundamental Verses of the 
Middle Way (MMK) 24:18a, “Whatever is dependently co-arisen / That is explained to be 
emptiness…”23 It seems clear here that Nāgārjuna is equating dependent origination and 
emptiness, and he continues in verse 19,  
                                                
22 Westerhoff, “Nāgārjuna”. 
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Something that is not dependently arisen, 
Such a thing does not exist. 
Therefore a nonempty thing 
Does not exist.24 
All phenomena are within the domain of inquiry here and all demonstrate some type of 
dependence. However, just because the notion of existence through some sort of substance-
svabhāva is rejected does not mean that existence, full stop, is rejected. Rather, what Nāgārjuna 
is saying is that the only way for things to exist is dependently, or ‘emptily’. Emptiness is a 
characterization of how things exist, not a proclamation that things do not exist at all.  
1.2.2 The Causation Arguments Against Svabhāva  
Nāgārjuna does not have a single master argument for emptiness but employs a number 
of different arguments that are meant to show the inconsistency or incoherence of certain notions 
when svabhāva is taken as a presupposition. Carpenter describes the procedure of Nāgārjuna’s 
MMK thusly,  
…the [MMK’s] examination of classic Abhidharma categories takes shape as a series of 
destructive tetralemmas: the catuṣkoti (tetralemma) should show that for any category, 
each of the logically possible positions regarding it, or implied by it, turns out to be 
untenable.25  
 
The very beginning of the MMK takes causation as its target, and here Nāgārjuna’s project is not 
to prove causation impossible, but rather that our understanding of causation is based on some 
faulty premise, such as that cause and effect exist with their own svabhāva.26  
In examining how things could be caused Nāgārjuna opens his MMK with,  
Neither from itself nor from another,   
                                                                                                                                                       
23 Jay Garfield. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. (New 




25 Carpenter, Indian, 79. 
 
26 Westerhoff, “Nāgārjuna”. 
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Nor from both,  
Nor without a cause,  
Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.27  
This is the aforementioned catuṣkoti, presenting all four possible options and rejecting all of 
them. In short, Nāgārjuna is rejecting that entities can be caused 1) from themselves, or 2) from 
other things, or 3) from both themselves and from other things, or 4) from neither. Recall that 
Nāgārjuna and the Ābhidharmikas do not disagree about the dependencies and lack of svabhāva 
on the conventional level, so the focus of these arguments, the entities in question, are those 
possessing substance-svabhāva – that is dharmas. However, for the following examination of 
options I will apply both conventional examples as well as examples using dharmas. 
The idea that anything could cause itself is counterintuitive to our normal understanding 
of how things arise. An acorn gives rise to an oak tree, but the acorn is not the only factor in 
bringing about the oak tree. Sunlight, water, warmth, and nutrient rich soil are also conditions 
that contribute the to arising of the oak tree, and these may be understood as the background 
conditions or the causal field.28 In analyzing an entity as self-caused Westerhoff gives two ways 
this could be interpreted, that cause and effect are identical, or that the effect is contained within, 
or forms part of, the causal field.29   
The refutation of self-causation via the identity of effect and cause is not a particularly 
controversial claim. For one dharma to be the effect and the cause of itself borders on the 
completely incoherent given the characterization of dharmas as possessors of substance-
svabhāva. Take a more mundane example of a fire and the spark that ignited it. It is not clear to 
me that much understanding is gained by asserting that the fire is identical with the spark that 
                                                
27 Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom, 3. 
 
28 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s, 95. 
 
29 Ibid, 100. 
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ignites it. Moreover, the acorn (along with the causal field) is decidedly not the oak tree. So this 
notion of self-causation I think can be safely discarded, or at the very least, shown to be 
fundamentally problematic. 
That the effect is in some way already a part of the causal field is the other way that self-
causation may be understood. If the effect is already within the causal field then it is not clear 
how the causal field is producing the effect since the effect is already present. Similarly, if we 
were presented with all of the components of the causal field (say the sunlight, soil, warmth, 
acorn etc.) then we should be acquainted with the effect already, in this case, the oak tree. Now 
we might be able to infer that an oak tree will arise but inference is not the same as the literal 
presence of the effect within the causal field, and it is this literal presence that Nāgārjuna is 
concerned with. Furthermore, if a cause and an effect are supposed to be independent entities, 
that is dharmas possessing substance-svabhāva, then this sort of intermingling of effect within 
cause does violence to any notion of independence attributed to substance-svabhāva.  
This emphasis on the distinctness of cause and effect leads one to the second option 
rejected by Nāgārjuna, that an effect is caused by some other entity. This is certainly the most 
natural way of conceiving of causation, as we understand spark and fire to be distinct as well as 
acorn and oak tree. Given this strong intuition Nāgārjuna’s rejection of this option becomes a 
significantly controversial claim. Nāgārjuna argues that the cause and the effect cannot be 
distinct because of the dependency that exists between the two. Westerhoff states,  
This is because the effect depends existentially on the cause (if the cause did not exist the 
effect would not exist) and cause depends at least notionally on the effect (if there was no 
effect the cause would not be called “cause”). The kind of independence demanded by 
[substance-svabhāva] is simply not available for things which are cause and effect.30 
 
                                                
30 Westerhoff, “Nāgārjuna”. 
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The problem here is with the way that substance-svabhāva has been defined, existing as 
fundamentally independent. Recall that the dharmas that constitute the Abhidharma ultimate 
reality are purportedly related only through causation, indicating that each dharma (possessing 
substance-svabhāva) causes the following dharma and so on until there is a causal stream that 
constitutes the enduring qualities of various objects. The ontological status afforded these 
dharmas, their substance-svabhāva, seems to disallow the most intuitive understanding of how 
causation works, which is precisely what Nāgārjuna is trying to show here.  
 The third alternative is that an object is caused both by itself and by other objects. One 
may think to dismiss this option immediately seeing that self-causation and causation from 
another have already been individually refuted, and a further argument to disprove their 
conjunction is unnecessary. However, Westerhoff presents a third possibility whereby the 
individual refutation of the previous two options will not suffice. He states that the most 
plausible way to understand this option is, 
…in terms of a cause that contains the effect in itself as a potentiality that is actualized 
given certain conditions. A block of marble (the cause) may be said to contain a statue 
(the result) as a potentiality that is made real by a variety of supporting conditions, 
namely the sculptor's actions. Here cause and effect are not wholly distinct (since the 
block and the statue share some parts) nor are they identical (since the block is not the 
statue), thereby avoiding the difficulties implied by the preceding two accounts.31 
 
Again the problem here is with the assertion of substance-svabhāva and the independent 
existence that both cause and effect are supposed to possess. Since the statue shares some parts 
with the marble then there is no independent existence of the statue or the marble. Moreover, if 
we apply this option to dharmas then the problem becomes clearer as a single dharma is by 
definition absolutely simple and could not contain multiple parts, one of which would have to be 
the potential effect. 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
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 The final option that Nāgārjuna rejects is that causation is neither self-causation nor 
causation by another object. This option is taken to be the denial of causation altogether if the 
previous three options exhaust the possibilities for causation. If so, then what Nāgārjuna is 
rejecting here is the denial of any apparent causal relation. The reasons for keeping some sort of 
causal relation, albeit one that is not based on presuppositions of svabhāva, is first, that our 
epistemic practices are causally based. The things that we know about the world are grasped via 
a causal relation with the world. If there were no causal relation then it would be difficult to gain 
any sort of beneficial information about the world that we necessarily are a part of. In addition, a 
world without causal regularity would be utterly foreign to us insofar as causal regularity appears 
to saturate the world.32 Candrakīrti, a seventh century Madhyamaka scholar, says in his 
Madhyamakāvatāra (a commentary on the MMK),  
If things arise in total absence of a cause,  
It follows that at all times, everything can come from anything.   
If that were so, then worldly people would not gather seeds,  
In all their myriad ways, to cultivate their crops.33  
 
Certain things follow from other things wind pushes water into ripples and waves, fire burning a 
log leads to ash and smoke, grass seeds give rise to grass and not to oak trees. If the world did 
not exhibit some sort of regularity then the practices that beings like us use to maneuver and 
survive in the world would be futile. Therefore, this fourth option of denying a causal relation is 
an insufficient way to account for our concept of causality.  
 One option that may seem missing here is that of the cause and the effect overlapping in 
some way. This seems to accord with how we understand the arising of various phenomena. A 
potter crafting a pot on her wheel is a process in which a lump of clay is gradually transformed 
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33 Verse 6:99, from Introduction to the Middle Way, Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (2002). 
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into a finished pot. Once again this is a model that cannot arise for the dharmas of Abhidharma 
ontology. Dharmas are momentary, temporally atomic units and they cannot undergo a 
temporally thick process of emergence.34 For some sort of emergence there would need to be 
temporal parts within the dharma such that it existed across some span of time with the effect 
(the next dharma) arising during the latter stages (temporal parts) of the causing dharma. 
Temporal parts indicate that the dharma is not absolutely simple; therefore emergence, and the 
temporal parts required of it, cannot be applied to dharmas.  
 Thus far we have explored how Nāgārjuna demonstrates the failing of causation when 
svabhāva is taken as a core presupposition. Indeed, Nāgārjuna endeavors to show not just that 
postulating some ultimate ontological ground is unnecessary but also impossible (as seen through 
the analysis of causation). Nāgārjuna does not limit his arguments to causation only, he applies 
the same maneuver to motion and change as well, but I will not canvass those arguments here as 
they proceed in a similar manner.  
1.2.3 Explicating the Madhyamaka Position   
The Buddhist path itself is commonly known as the middle way, referring to a middling 
position between asceticism and sensual indulgence. The term “Madhyamaka” alludes to this 
characterization of Buddhism35 but refers to a middle position between nihilism (or 
annihilationism) and reificationism (or eternalism). Hayes states that this school,  
…avoids the two extremes of eternalism—the doctrine that all things exist because  
of an eternal essence—and annihilationism—the doctrine that things have essences while 
they exist but that these essences are annihilated just when the things themselves go out 
of existence.36 
 
                                                
34 Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s, 202. 
 
35 “Madhyamaka” literally means something like “belonging to the most middle”. 
 
36 Hayes, “Madhyamaka”. 
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The assertion of svabhāva, which Nāgārjuna endeavors to show as incoherent, is taken to be a 
type of reification, one extreme Madhyamaka strives to avoid. The other extreme of nihilism or 
annihilationism is a charge that is commonly levied against Mādhyamikas due to their own 
denial of svabhāva. Yet insofar as metaphysics involves holding some sort of foundational or 
ultimate ontology (assertion of svabhāva) then Nāgārjuna is not quite participating in the same 
metaphysical project. Moreover, it is only from this substantialist or foundationalist approach to 
ontology that charges of nihilism or reificationism arise. The manner in which Madhyamaka tries 
to carve out a defensible position here, while holding that all things are empty of svabhāva, is an 
interpretative task that has occupied commentators and scholars since Nāgārjuna’s time. There 
are long commentarial traditions with various interpretations in both India and Tibet but many 
contemporary scholars tend to adopt a particular reading of Madhyamaka. I will follow Jay 
Garfield in explicating this interpretation37, but given the nature of interpretations this need not 
be the only one.  
The midpoint that Nāgārjuna seeks to establish relies on a three-way correlation between 
emptiness, dependent origination, and convention. Recall 24:18 from his MMK, 
   Whatever is dependently co-arisen 
   That is explained to be emptiness. 
   That, being a dependent designation, 
   Is itself the middle way.38 
The first assertion here is an identification of emptiness and that which is dependently arisen; to 
say that something is dependently arisen is to say that it is empty and, conversely, to say that 
something is empty is to say that it is dependently arisen. Emptiness and the world of 
dependently arisen phenomena (i.e. conventional reality) are not distinct things but two different 
                                                
37 Garfield in his Fundamental Wisdom, and Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural 
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38 Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom, 69. 
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ways of characterizing the same thing.39 In addition, as this interpretation goes, there is a relation 
between whatever is dependently arisen and verbal conventions. As Garfield states,  
…the identity of any dependently arisen thing depends upon verbal conventions. To say 
of a thing that it is dependently arisen is to say that its identity as a single entity is 
nothing more than its being the referent of a word. The thing itself, apart from 
conventions of individuation, is nothing but an arbitrary slice of an indefinite 
spatiotemporal and causal manifold. To say of a thing that its identity is a merely verbal 
fact is to say that it is empty40 
 
The latter part of 24:18 indicates that emptiness itself is a dependent designation and as such it 
too is conventionally existent but ultimately empty. Emptiness viewed thusly is not some sort of 
entity, as this would reify emptiness, nor is it entirely unreal, as this would be annihilationist, but 
rather, emptiness is conventionally real. Conventional reality can be assessed similarly, being 
dependently arisen it cannot be non-empty, but it is also not completely nonexistent, it exists but 
its existence is characterized by emptiness. Furthermore, the same analysis can be applied to 
convention. Convention, for the Mādhyamika, is not ontologically insignificant, as it is in 
Abhidharma, because it is convention that determines the character of the phenomenal world, nor 
is it ontologically efficacious because it is empty.41 In the following verse of the MMK (24:19) 
Nāgārjuna reinforces the extent to which this analysis applies, recall: 
Something that is not dependently arisen, 
Such a thing does not exist. 
Therefore a nonempty thing 
Does not exist.42 
Everything that exists is dependently arisen because everything that exists is empty. Yet the only 
existence that can obtain is conventional existence, and this, in turn, is characterized as 
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dependently arisen and empty. As Garfield states, “…nothing lacks the three co-extensive 
properties of emptiness, dependent origination, and conventional identity.”43 For the 
Mādhyamika, the three-way correlation of emptiness, dependent origination, and convention 
functions to carve out a middle position between nihilism and reificationism. Moreover, 
emptiness itself does not escape this analysis leading to the proposition that emptiness is itself 
empty. Yet this must naturally follow for to assert emptiness as non-empty would be to assert 
that emptiness exists in virtue of some independent nature, that is, to reify emptiness as some sort 
of ineliminable ontological property, and this would be a slip into one extreme Madhyamaka 
seeks to avoid. 
 In sum, Mādhyamikas endeavor to position themselves between one extreme that denies 
existence entirely (nihilism) and another extreme that asserts an ontologically robust notion of 
existence via svabhāva (reificationism). This is done through the three-way correlation of 
emptiness, dependent origination, and convention. Mādhyamikas avoid nihilism by rejecting a 
svabhāva based approach to ontology, and they avoid reificationism by applying emptiness 
universally. Conventional reality, maligned as second-rate in Abhidharma, becomes the center of 
Madhyamaka understanding but only when understood as dependently arisen and empty. In this 
way conventional reality becomes foundational, not in a metaphysically loaded manner, but 
insofar as the conventional is understood as dependently arisen, empty, and a product of verbal 
convention, then it is all that can be countenanced in one’s ontology.  
1.2.3a Emptiness of Emptiness and the Two Truths 
 To hold emptiness as non-empty would be to assert that it has svabhāva, that it has some 
sort of substantial essence that analysis can reveal, or that is can be fully characterized in a non-
relational manner. It should be clear at this point that this notion is anathema to Nāgārjuna, yet to 
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assert that emptiness is itself empty is by no means an easily grasped conclusion. If we take a 
conventional entity, again we shall use the chariot, we can analyze it to demonstrate its 
emptiness. There is no chariot apart from its parts, nor can the chariot be identified in isolation 
from its own antecedent and subsequent histories.44 This emptiness itself, the emptiness of the 
chariot, amounts to the chariot’s lack of svabhāva, and this is dependent upon the chariot for if 
there were no dependently arisen chariot then there would be no emptiness of the chariot either.  
To view the chariot as empty is not to see “through” the chariot to some fundamental reality, but 
to see the chariot as conventional and dependent, for that is all that its emptiness entails. The 
empty chariot does not become some different entity for the Mādhyamika but is seen as it is – 
dependent, conventional, and empty. Garfield states,  
Emptiness is hence not different from conventional reality – it is the fact that 
conventional reality is conventional. Hence it must be dependently arisen, since it 
depends upon the existence of empty phenomena. Hence emptiness itself is empty.45 
 
Understanding that the chariot has dependently arisen and has an identity in virtue of 
conventional verbal designation is to see it as empty, and this emptiness is nothing more than the 
understanding of these facts about the chariot. 
 This conception is deeply connected to the Madhyamaka understanding of the two truths.  
 Conventional truth in Madhyamaka is similar to the Abhidharma understanding, whereby things 
are conventionally true if they accord with the standards of convention. Convention here may 
mean several things, so for example there is strong and reasoned consensus for things like 
scientific theories. These have been experimentally shown and the results incorporated into the 
current body of scientific knowledge. This is one conventional approach to truth, but others may 
involve mere agreement on the verbal conventions that constitute conventional reality. When 
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people speak of water there is a clear understanding of what is being referred to, that which is 
wet, (typically) clear, and necessary for life on earth. If one were to use the term “water” but 
refer to something to which the previous description – i.e. conventional understanding – did not 
apply then this would be (conventionally) false.46 One principal difference between Abhidharma 
and Madhyamaka is that the latter does not consider conventional truth to be second-rate. The 
Madhyamaka approach to conventional reality is not one of scorn but one that sees it as the only 
reality possible. However, the extent to which these conceptions differ will become more 
apparent in what follows. 
Ultimate truth in Madhyamaka is the assertion of the universal emptiness of all 
phenomena, but as we have seen this claim is about conventional reality. So the ultimate claim of 
emptiness is a testament to how conventional reality operates. For the Ābhidharmika ultimate 
truths are statements that concern ultimate reality, dharmas etc., but the Mādhyamika asserts that 
ultimate truth is not correlated to an ultimate reality. In this manner the Mādhyamika denies that 
there is an ultimate reality, for their claim of ultimate truth only concerns conventional reality. 
For Nāgārjuna the search for some ultimate reality, insofar as that project is meant to incorporate 
svabhāva or some other ontological ground, is futile. What we are left with is the conventional 
world and a claim regarding how it operates. Conventional reality is not ontologically second-
rate as it is in Abhidharma, but becomes the principal way to understand the full import of the 
Madhyamaka position.  
 Ultimate truth cannot be about an ultimate reality, as there isn’t one, but it can still 
pertain to the soteriological goals of Buddhism. In his MMK chapter 24:8-10 Nāgārjuna states,  
 The Buddha’s teaching of the Dharma 
  Is based on two truths: 
                                                
46 Distinguishing conventional truths and conventional falsities seems necessary, more so for the 
Madhyamikā because of their seeming denial of an ultimate reality. This issue will be explored further down. 
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  A truth of worldly convention 
  And an ultimate truth. 
  
 Those who do not understand 
  The distinction between these two truths 
  Do not understand 
  The Buddha’s profound truth 
  
 Without a foundation in the conventional truth, 
 The significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. 
 Without understanding the significance of the ultimate 
 Liberation is not achieved.47 
 
The ultimate truth still concerns the awakening of an individual, it is just that this is now a fact 
about the conventional. This understanding of the thoroughly empty nature of conventional 
reality is the key to attaining liberation, it is only through the conventional that one can grasp the 
ultimate and have any chance of awakening. Nāgārjuna also points to this in his MMK chapter 
25:19 where he states,  
   There is not the slightest difference 
   Between cyclic existence and nirvāṇa. 
   There is not the slightest difference 
   Between nirvāṇa and cyclic existence.48 
Cyclic existence here is saṃsāra, a term meaning a cyclical and aimless existence whereby one 
is constantly being reborn only to suffer and die and be reborn again ad infinitum.49 The 
liberation from this cycle is nirvāṇa, which is brought about through the awakening or 
enlightenment that forms an end goal of Buddhist practice. So despite the fact that there is no 
longer any sort of ontological bifurcation between ultimate and conventional reality there is still 
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and religion, each of which deals with it in ways particular to that religion.  
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an ultimate truth that facilitates awakening – emptiness. It is just that this truth does not 
correspond to an ultimate reality in the way that Abhidharma ultimate truths do.  
1.3 The Problem Emerges 
 Recall that any philosophical endeavor in Buddhism is fundamentally oriented towards 
the soteriological goal of awakening. The default view of the world is deeply flawed insofar as it 
engenders greed, hatred, or ignorance, which in turn always lead to suffering. Correcting 
ignorance through a proper metaphysical understanding is the reason why Buddhist metaphysical 
claims are revisionary, as the default view is in need of revision. But if Madhyamaka has 
jettisoned any sort of ultimate reality then there seems to be nothing that the conventional default 
view of the world is revised against, no benchmark by which misunderstanding is corrected. If 
this is the case then the question is what situates truth claims within a world that is taken to be 
merely conventional? If truth claims are to have revisionary traction, then they cannot be “made 
true” merely through the adopted conventions that constitute conventional reality. This problem 
faces any anti-realist position regarding claims made under the assumption that there is no 
independently existing world “out there” acting as a truthmaker for our claims. This is especially 
salient in the Buddhist context because of the highly soteriological nature of their enterprise. 
Since the Buddhist path is characterized by a number of ethical claims and directives, situating 
these within a wholly conventional – anti-realist – framework appears to be of paramount 
importance. The Mādhyamika is then in a particularly tight spot by holding what appears to be a 
form of anti-realism while also asserting revisionary ethical claims.  
 The question may arise of whether the Mādhyamika is really so poorly off in this 
situation as there is a whole literature within contemporary Western philosophy dealing with 
anti-realism and truth, and perhaps there are options here for the Mādhyamika to exploit. The 
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idea would be that the Mādhyamika only has to hold a theory of truth that does not require an 
ultimate ontological reality to act as a foundation or benchmark for claims. By rejecting, say, the 
correspondence theory of truth the Mādhyamika need not reject all of the ways that a claim could 
be taken as true, so perhaps her claims can be viewed on a different theory. If, say, a 
Mādhyamika were to adopt a coherence theory of truth then the claims they make would be true 
insofar as they were coherent with the set of propositions that she already held as true. This, 
however, seems to be less helpful when considering the revisionary claims that Madhyamaka 
wants to make. If a Mādhyamika is bound to conventional reality and the set of propositions that 
she holds as true is formed on the basis of this conventional situation then highly revisionary 
claims may not cohere with this set in virtue of their revisionary nature. I think it is plausible to 
assert that one’s coherent set of beliefs, causally created through one’s engagement with the 
conventional world, is going to be largely made up of conventional truths. These conventional 
truths constitute the default view of the world that Buddhism targets, so it seems that situating 
Buddhist claims, metaphysical or ethical, by appealing to a web of conventional truths is the 
wrong direction in which to look.  
1.3.1 Upāya-kauśalya 
 What is needed is some account of truth that is able to situate truth claims made under a 
Madhyamaka framework. When a Mādhyamika makes a claim there must be something 
appealed to that gives the claim some sort of normative weight. This account may hold for all 
truths but I am particularly interested in the ethical domain. To this end I think there is promise 
in co-opting and expanding a concept from elsewhere is Buddhist thought – upāya. Upāya-
kauśalya translates as “skillful means” and is typically employed to describe a teaching 
technique attributed to the Buddha (and other spiritually advanced beings) whereby teachings are 
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adjusted to suit the situation and comportment of a less spiritually developed audience. Charles 
Goodman states,  
The idea is that the Buddhas don’t always tell such people the final truth; instead, they 
tell them whatever they need to hear at the time, including even falsehoods, if doing so 
will be the most effective way to support their progress towards spiritual maturity.50 
 
The paradigm example comes from the Lotus Sūtra, a popular early Mahāyāna text, which 
presents an allegorical story that gives a sense of upāya at work. Briefly, a wealthy old man has a 
rather large and decrepit house with only one door. A fire breaks out and threatens to engulf the 
whole house, and with it the wealthy man’s children who are inside absorbed in their play. The 
man calls out to them repeatedly in vain so in desperation he calls out to tell his children that 
there are goat-carts, deer-carts, and ox-carts outside, things that he knows they all enjoy. At 
mention of this the children rush out and are saved from the flames, but there are no carts of any 
kind to be seen.51 This may be seen as an exercise in upāya because the children were deceived, 
but for the purposes of saving them from a fiery death.  
As far as spiritual instruction goes, this technique is seen as a means to an end whereby 
the end is the Buddhist goal of awakening. But whereas the children were told an outright lie, 
upāya as a pedagogical tool relies on teachings that are not true in an ultimate sense. For 
example, the Buddha may indicate to a particular practitioner that there exists a self, even though 
this assertion contradicts a core Buddhist doctrine. Some sense of self may be a conventional 
truth and it may be the thing that this practitioner needs to hear at this particular time for them to 
progress along the path, but ultimately speaking this is a falsehood. My proposed application of 
upāya is primarily a pragmatic one and chiefly concerned with situating ethical claims in the 
                                                
50 Charles Goodman, “Śāntideva”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2016 ed. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/shantideva (2016). 
 
51 Michael Pye, Skillful Means: A Concept in Mahayana Buddhism, 2nd Edition (New York: Routledge, 
1978), 37. 
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absence of ultimate reality. General truth claims within Madhyamaka, I will argue, follow a 
similarly pragmatic justification, whereby the validity of a truth claim is cashed out in terms of 
its efficacy in maneuvering through conventional reality, which allows the Mādhyamika to sift 
conventional truth from conventional falsity. Upāya as a way to give normative weight to ethical 
claims proceeds with a more specific goal than general truth claims in Madhyamaka, one that 
concerns the particular soteriological goals of Buddhism.  
In brief, the upāya approach to ethical truths couches their truth and normativity in terms 
of the effectiveness of these ethical claims in progressing a practitioner along the Buddhist path 
to awakening. Such truths would be particularly potent for practitioners on this path and that 
which is considered ethical falsity would be those claims that obstruct or reverse progression 
along the path. I think that this approach is particularly plausible when considering the 
philosophical constraints of the Madhyamaka position as well as particular insights from 







The Buddha’s analysis of the human condition identifies suffering (duḥkha) as 
fundamentally problematic, and his recommendation of a remedy encapsulated in the Four Noble 
Truths and Eightfold Path indicate a causal approach to this problem, much like a physician 
treating an illness. Eliminating suffering involves eliminating the causes of suffering while also 
cultivating the causes of happiness. In this respect the Buddhist path consists of a number of 
claims that indicate certain actions to avoid and certain actions to take. These are ethical claims52 
as they concern how one ought to conduct oneself individually and in relation to others in accord 
with the Buddhist normative project. The Buddha’s analysis indicates that our normal way of 
understanding the world and ourselves includes deleterious presuppositions that contribute to our 
perpetual suffering. For the Buddha’s message to have any traction it must be the case that we 
can, in some meaningful way, alter the situation in which we find ourselves. There has to be a 
sense in which the actions we take (or do not take) have some meaningful effect upon our own 
futures, for if it did not then the Buddhist path as a way to eliminate suffering or effect any 
change would be pointless. We seem to run into some difficulty here as Buddhism asserts the 
doctrine of anātman, or “non-self” which seems to eliminate the very agent by which meaningful 
change can occur. If there is no agent then how can “my” actions make a difference to “my” 
                                                
52 In one sense these may be considered merely prudential claims, for the method outlined by the Buddha is 
only appropriate for those that wish to be rid of suffering (duḥkha). This leaves the possibility that for those that do 
not wish to be rid of suffering or perhaps enjoy it (perhaps a masochist of some sort), the Buddhist project has no 
appeal. However, the full range of meaning in the term duḥkha indicates not only gross forms of bodily harm and 
pain, but also deeper anxieties regarding frustration in not obtaining what one desires and losing what one has 
already obtained. Insofar as the masochist desires something and will not be able to hold onto it indefinitely then he 
too will experience duḥkha. Yet there may be those that still find no appeal in the Buddhist criticism of suffering, 
perhaps those that lack the psychological ability to either feel pain or experience desire and frustration. However, 
these instances are probably indicative of an atypical neurology/psychology and likely occupy a very small minority 
of the human population. Given this, the Buddha’s claims that duḥkha is both pervasive and problematic apply to 
vast majority of human beings. This seems to indicate that the claims that constitute a path out of suffering impinge 
upon (almost) all human beings and therefore ought to be followed by (almost) all human beings.   
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future? The Buddhist assertion of the thoroughly dependent nature of all phenomena, whereby 
any composite entity can be “dissolved” into its causes, parts, or conventional identity deepens 
the problem of how to understand agency in Buddhism as these causes and conditions enervate 
typical notions of an agent. We seem to be left in a troubling situation whereby the agent has 
been enfeebled or eliminated but we also seem to require agency for the central purpose of 
eliminating suffering.  
In the West many of the issues that surround agency concern free will, determinism, and 
moral responsibility. The will, according to Jay Garfield, is the legacy of Augustine and his 
struggle in responding to the problem of evil53. Briefly, if God is the cause of all things, and evil 
exists in the world, then God would end up being the cause of evil. If this is the case then it 
seems that God is not omnibenevolent, a core attribute of Western conceptions of God. 
Augustine’s solution to this was to absolve God of the causation of evil54 by proposing a faculty 
that allowed persons to produce free, uncaused action – a free will. Thereby making human 
beings the ultimate authors of their own actions. God’s creation of this faculty does not mean 
that the usage of this faculty reflects God’s benevolence, and God is therefore absolved of the 
presence of evil. It is this connection of morality to freedom that has reverberated throughout 
Western discussions of issues surrounding agency55, and, according to Garfield, 
It grounds the political and legal theory of the enlightenment to which we are heirs, and 
infuses our high and popular culture with a presupposition of the reality of the will and its 
freedom. It also leads us to take for granted the idea that we are only persons in the full 
                                                
53 Jay Garfield, “Just Another Word For Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency, and Ethics for 
Mādhyamikas,” in Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, ed. Matthew Dasti (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 165-66. 
 
54 In traditional church doctrine this ultimately comes back to the Fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden of 
Eden. This “original sin” resulted in not only the punishment of Adam and Eve, but also all of humanity.  
 
55 I use this term to cover discussions of determinism, free will, moral responsibility, and action. 
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sense to the degree that we are free, and that moral responsibility is possible only in the 
context of this freedom.56 
 
No appeal to this story can be made in the context of Buddhism as nothing like this situation has 
arisen in Buddhist discussions. Yet this does not mean that Buddhists do not care about these 
sorts of issues, as we have seen agency (of some sort) is a necessary requirement that undergirds 
the whole Buddhist project. Rather, when we approach these questions in Buddhism we must 
exercise caution regarding the paradigms that have shaped this discussion in the West. To 
neglect this would be at best a limitation to any potential understanding, and at worst a form of 
cultural and philosophical imposition. It seems to me that the best way to approach these issues 
in Buddhism is to look where discussions of agency issues actually arise without necessarily 
needing to categorize this or that articulation as “determinist”, or “compatibilist” etc. Buddhists 
most certainly care about moral responsibility, agency, and freedom; it is just that these 
discussions take a different form than that in the West. 
My concern regarding ethical claims in Madhyamaka is undergirded by questions of 
agency. In this respect I endeavor to apply my expanded conception of upāya to see how (or if) 
agency can be understood or situated similarly in the Madhyamaka framework. I will first 
examine interpretations of agency in Abhidharma before turning to interpretations in 
Madhyamaka. Then I will see how (or if) agency issues can be handled through the application 
of upāya, particularly in Madhyamaka. All of this serves to buttress an understanding of the 
ethical claims made within Madhyamaka, for every ethical claim presupposes some sort of 
agency. Moreover, my proposition of upāya as a way to justify claims essentially involves 
situating claims within the Buddhist plan of action – the path toward awakening. What this will 
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amount to is not the successful situation of agency as a form of upāya, but of the understanding 
of a particularly robust type of agency as a form of upāya.  
2.1 Abhidharma Agency 
Chapter one discussed how Abhidharma Buddhism maintains an ontological 
reductionism of composite objects into metaphysically substantive dharmas, importantly though 
an analysis of the person also displays this reductive approach. On this view, what we 
conventionally call the “person” ultimately consists in the existence of five skandhas (bundles, 
aggregates, or heaps) organized in the correct manner. These five skandhas are 1) rūpa, the body 
or material form, 2) vedanā, affective feeling, 3) saṃjñā, perception and cognition, 4) saṃskāra, 
conditioning or constructing activities, and 5) vijñāna, consciousness. These skandhas are not 
separable and come together to form a dynamic and functionally integrated psycho-physical 
system. Support for this view of the person usually proceeds by analyzing various elements of 
human experience and accounting for them by appealing to one or more of these skandhas. 
Moreover, the definition of skandhas as “aggregate” or “bundle” refers to the fact that the 
skandhas themselves are composed of more basic bits, dharmas. There is no priority of the 
material or psychological elements on this account, and no apparent difficulty in causal relations 
between the two types. So we have a view that dissolves the person into various skandhas and 
the skandhas into momentary dharmas. The dharmas interact causally and constitute self-similar 
streams that are grouped as each skandha, the collection of all five we conventionally take to be 
a person. The idea is that these five skandhas explain all of the things that we typically attribute 
to a “self” and a proper understanding of this reductive account loosens self-grasping or self-
reification and therefore facilitates awakening. 
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It should be noted that Buddhist reductionism could come in various flavors. On one 
interpretation of the Abhidharma project when we speak of persons or other composite entities 
we are speaking of wholly illusory entities. Here a person is really a collection of dharmas 
arranged in a particular manner. This type of reductionism is eliminativist as it seeks to eliminate 
the person from our ontology. On this view we are in error when speaking of the person or of any 
other composite entity, when what we should be speaking of are dharmas or skandhas. Another 
flavor of reductionism is less austere and seeks to situate the reality of persons and composite 
entities, albeit in a less substantial manner than that of dharmas. On this latter view when we 
speak of composite entities we are speaking of real things but we are asserting that they consist 
in these more basic elements. That is, the person and the table are real but they ultimately consist 
in skandhas and dharmas. This description maps onto the distinction between ultimate and 
conventional reality, but the difficulty here comes when different interpreters take conventional 
reality to be wholly illusory, thereby holding an eliminativist position, or less substantial but still 
real in a significant enough sense. This distinction will become important later on as we see how 
Abhidharma understands issues surrounding agency. 
2.1.1 Meyers’s Account 
According to Karin Meyers any discussion of issues surrounding agency in Buddhism 
must begin with the acknowledgment of the tension indicated in the introduction above. She 
explains that on the conventional level persons seem to engage in deliberation, choice, and 
willful action, yet at the ultimate level there are not even persons to whom these actions could be 
attributed (this latter point is exemplified in the no-self doctrine). Moreover, the goal of the 
Buddhist project is the elimination of suffering and liberation from saṃsāra, and the path to this 
goal is contingent upon there being some kind of meaningful agency that we can exercise. 
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Consideration of these tensions helps us avoid imposing Western concerns onto Buddhist 
discourse. Meyers’s interpretation seeks to explain what we understand conventionally in terms 
of what is actually going on ultimately. In this sense she appeals to the dharmas operative in the 
sequence of (mental) events issuing in an action. 
Notions of agency and action in Buddhism, especially in the Abhidharma, are tightly 
connected to the Buddhist understanding of karma. Karma literally means “action”, and this 
includes both an act itself as well as the fruit of that act. In a well-known passage from the Palī 
canon the Buddha explains karma, 
Students, beings are owners of their actions, heirs of their actions; they originate from 
their actions, are bound to their actions, have their actions as their refuge. It is action that 
distinguishes beings as inferior and superior.57 
 
This statement is a response to a student’s question as to why some human beings seem to suffer 
misfortune while others do not (the distinction between inferiority and superiority). So this 
indicates first, that karma describes a causal relationship between types of action and quality of 
life, and second, that the moral quality of the action is what determines what kind of result will 
occur. The moral quality of an action is typically described as kuśala, “wholesome”, 
“beneficial”, or “skillful”, or akuśala, “unwholesome”, “unbeneficial”, or “unskillful”58. So the 
claim is that within an individual’s single life wholesome actions tend to result in positive 
consequences for that individual, while unwholesome actions tend to result in negative 
consequences. 
Discussion of karma includes differentiating purposeful action from mere events, and this 
is familiar in Western discussions as significant weight is placed upon the intention to perform 
                                                
57 “Cūla-kammavibhanga Sutta,” The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, 3rd Edition, trans. Bhikku 
Ñāṇamoli and Bhikku Bodhi (Boston: Wisdom, 1995 [2005]), 1053. 
 
58 In the context of the Buddhist project what counts as wholesome are those actions, characteristics, and 
virtues that the Buddhist path endorses, things like generosity (dāna), compassion (karuṇā), or wisdom (prajñā). 
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some act in evaluating the moral valence of that act. Regarding this the Buddha explained, “I 
say, oh monks, karma is an intending (cetanā). Intending, one acts with the body, speech, or 
mind.”59 (I follow Karin Meyers’s translation here of cetanā as “an intending” as she calls 
attention to the verbal sense of the Sanskrit term, adding that cetanā is not something someone 
has but rather it is something that someone does60, and in this sense it is action (karma) in its 
own right). Here cetanā is presented as the defining characteristic of action, and this is intuitive 
as an action is brought about when one intends to perform an action. Meyers goes on to state that 
cetanā is a highly polyvalent term, but despite this she distills the most basic sense of cetanā as 
simply, “…the movement of a mind (citta) towards an object or goal.”61 This demonstrates an 
intentional structure, but it should be noted that cetanā also connotes affective and conative 
elements.62 One may be tempted to read the Buddha’s statement above as indicating that karma 
is deliberate and conscious action, or that the results of karma are determined primarily by the 
conscious intention behind the action. In this case an analogy would be drawn between karmic 
fruits and moral deserts, with cetanā as an analog of free will or choice, but Meyers cautions 
against this interpretation saying, 
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60 Karin Meyers “Freedom and Self-Control: Freedom in South Asian Buddhism” (PhD diss., University of 
Chicago, 2010) 139, fn 7. 
 
61 Karin Meyers, “Free Persons, Empty Selves: Freedom and Agency in Light of the Two Truths,” in Free 
Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, ed. Matthew Dasti (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
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62 The saṃskāra-skandha includes cognitive, affective, and conative elements but only as intimately tied to 
the effects of conditioning. MacKenzie explains, “…[the] saṃskāra-skandha (conditioning) includes the various 
dispositions, capacities, and formations — such as sensorimotor skills, memories, habits, emotional dispositions, 
volitions, and cognitive schemas — that both enable and constrain the person and her experiences. This category 
also includes our basic conative impulses — attraction, aversion, and indifference — which are in turn closely tied 
to our feelings and the affective modalities (vedanā) of experience. In the Buddhist view, typically one’s whole 
being in the world is driven by this sedimented conditioning — and not always for the better. Indeed, the basic 
conative impulses often manifest in pathological ways, such as the ‘three poisons’ of greed, hatred, and ignorance.” 
From his “Enacting Selves, Enacting Worlds: On the Buddhist Theory of Karma,” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 
63, No. 2 (April 2013): 199.  
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The problem is that in classical Buddhist sources, facts about moral responsibility do not 
always map directly onto facts about karma: a person is not necessarily morally 
responsible for his karma or morally deserving of its results.63 
 
The basic definition that Meyers provides indicates that cetanā may not always be voluntary, 
conscious, or subject to choice. For example, when sleeping or in dream states the mind still is 
directed toward some object or objects, in this case the dream phenomena, yet typically this 
content is not something that is under the direct control of the one who is dreaming. Since cetanā 
is not always deliberate, conscious, or subject to choice – all things associated with free will to 
some degree – it appears unsuitable to fulfill the role of a free will. In sum, cetanā distinguishes 
an action from an event, and as such plays a necessary role in the ascription of responsibility, but 
does not in itself entail responsibility. Cetanā may be the most crucial factor in karma but this 
does not mean that karma and cetanā are equivalent. 
2.1.2 How Free Are We? 
Despite the fact that cetanā is not itself an analog to free will its role in responsibility is 
important for understanding how an individual exercises agency. I have belabored the fact that 
the Buddhist path requires some sense of meaningful agency otherwise it would be a pointless 
endeavor. The Abhidharma understanding of how one effects change in one’s life does concern 
cetanā, but not as some free will analog. Here it is important to see that the Buddhist path is 
concerned specifically with freedom from suffering, and that this is achieved through various 
forms of self-control. The default position in which people find themselves is characterized by 
ignorance regarding the fundamental nature of reality and maladaptive emotions (greed and 
hatred); these drive actions in such a way to perpetuate suffering. So in this sense those not on 
the path, those fully entrenched in the default position, are the least free because their actions are 
compelled by these deleterious factors. However, since all action is conditioned by mental 
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factors, of which cetanā is one type, both the perpetuation of suffering and the liberation from 
suffering operate in a similar manner. In the former, an individual has a mistaken conception of 
how actions arise, and may think he is a substantial agent who “owns” and enacts his actions 
outside of any causal chain. In the latter, a practitioner understands that actions are conditioned 
by mental factors, and that certain (wholesome, kuśala) factors can be emphasized while others 
(unwholesome, akuśala) can be diminished. This ability to choose the influence of certain mental 
factors is often described in terms of mastery or control over the mind. Indeed in the Palī canon 
one finds expressions like, “…a bhikkhu (monk) wields mastery over his mind, he does not let 
the mind wield mastery over him.”64 Furthermore, Meyers points out that certain qualities, 
namely, faith (śraddhā), energy (vīrya), mindfulness (smṛti), concentration (samādhi), and 
discernment (prajñā), are significantly referred to as ruling or controlling faculties.65 In practice 
these types of qualities and the approach endorsed by the path would operate by opening up a 
sort of space between a mental state and action. For example, a practitioner may experience 
anger but recognizes this as an unwholesome mental state and therefore chooses not to act upon 
it, whereas those not on the path may not have this ability and may unreflectively act on their 
anger. So it seems that the type of freedom available to most people is quite limited, whereas 
those on the path acquire greater and greater freedom through Buddhist practices that weaken the 
reactionary bond between mental state and action. 
It is important to note that within the Abhidharma framework the aforementioned mental 
factors are operative on the ultimate level of dharmas. The umbrella of conditioning (saṃskāra-
skandha) that partly constitutes the conventional person includes cetanā as well as these other 
mental factors. The actions typically ascribed to conventional persons are the result of cetanā 
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and other mental factors causally operating in a particular way upon the mental stream of an 
individual. The conventional agency of the practitioner is then explained through an appeal to 
ultimate reality in terms of the causal interaction of momentary dharmas, and, in this sense, 
dissolves any sort of robust autonomous agent. This understanding begins to sound similar to 
what Thomas Nagel described as the objective or external standpoint. On Nagel’s view, if we 
consider our actions as part of the causal fabric of the world, that is impersonally, then we 
become paralyzed and helpless. He states, 
The essential source of the problem is a view of persons and their actions as part of the 
order of nature, causally determined or not. That conception, if pressed, leads to the 
feeling that we are not agents at all, that we are helpless and not responsible for what we 
do.66 
 
Where Nagel views this approach as debilitating, Buddhists assert that not only is this 
therapeutic but can also enhance the ability to control action.67 From this framework Meyers 
points out that there seem to be two problems, one theoretical and one practical. First, how can 
Buddhists explain choice and control enjoyed by ordinary persons or advanced practitioners 
when they deny that agents cause actions? Second, what prevents the doctrine of non-self from 
undermining a sense of agency crucial to the initiative and effort needed to engage on the path?68 
Her solution to each of these questions is intimately connected to the Buddhist doctrine of the 
two truths. 
2.1.3 The Two Truths and Free Action 
Despite the fact that conventional phenomena may be explicable in terms of ultimate 
reality there is no equivalence between facts about persons and facts about dharmas. Meyers 
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indicates that certain facts about persons only make sense because they require persons and 
cannot be ascribed to dharmas.69 This is another reason why attempts to locate some free will 
analog at the ultimate level (in cetanā or elsewhere) are misguided, as attributes such as freedom 
or moral responsibility are contingent upon persons, not particular elements that constitute the 
person. To neglect this is to make a sort of category error, attributing characteristics of a person 
to dharmas, which cannot possibly possess them. The crucial issue for Meyers in explaining 
freedom is, 
…identifying the kinds of dharmas and relationships between dharmas whose salience in 
the mental process (citta-santāna) issuing in action accounts for the empirical distinction 
between free and compelled or constrained action. In other words, persons can be said to 
choose or control an action when it issues from the right sort of causes in the right sort of 
mental state (citta) with the right sort causal history, regardless of the truth of causal 
determinism.70 
 
The appeal to the right kinds of causal relationships is an appeal to ultimate reality. The 
conventional person and her attendant agency is not discarded through this explanation but rather 
that agency is explained as consisting in these certain relations that occur at the ultimate level. 
The question then becomes, what are the right sorts of mental states, causal histories etc. that 
demarcate free from compelled action?  
One principal task within Abhidharma is the classification of various kinds of dharmas 
and conditioning relationships that obtain between them. I will not venture to give anything close 
to an exhaustive account of these, but some general comments will help illuminate the questions 
Meyers poses. We have seen that cetanā is the defining feature of action so it must be present in 
all action, but we also have seen that it alone is not sufficient to distinguish free from compelled 
action. Given the Buddhist concern with karmic fruition certain conditions that bear on this 
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question do arise. For instance, Vasubandhu mentions that in the case of verbal or bodily action 
there must be an appropriate relationship between cetanā and the verbal utterance or bodily 
movement, one where the latter is the object or aim of cetanā.71 For murder to have the full 
karmic consequences (full in the sense of appropriately relevant for the act of murder) there can 
be no cognitive error in the act or doubt about the identity of the victim. Here veridical 
knowledge regarding the act of murder and the victim function as conditions that, in addition to 
cetanā, result in negative karmic fruition. This is intuitive because we typically don’t ascribe 
responsibility to those that lack a basic sense of awareness about their actions or the objects of 
their actions. If one cannot separate reality from fantasy, as is in some cases of mental illness, 
then this becomes a mitigating factor for moral responsibility. Indeed one Buddhist monastic 
code72 presents madness and extreme pain to be mitigating factors for assigning culpability, so 
the absence of these may indicate some conditions that must obtain for meaningful freedom. 
Meyers notes, 
There are, in fact, a variety of mental factors that pick out the sort of cognitive, affective, 
and conative conditions that might figure into the distinction between free and compelled 
or constrained action, such as attention (manaskāra), approbation (adhimokṣa), desire for 
action (chanda), discernment (mati), reflection (vitarka), examination (vicāra), doubt 
(vicikitsā), delusion (moha), and anger (krodha).73 
 
While some of these mental factors align with western intuitions regarding culpability (as in the 
case of madness) Buddhists go so far as to assert that the default position people find themselves 
in is one of extremely limited freedom due to the pervasive conditioning of greed, hatred, and the 
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delusion of self-grasping. Since these people are the least free then it seems that they are also the 
least responsible for their own actions. 
This may sound like a wholesale abandonment of moral responsibility but rather it speaks 
to particular standards and practices to which the Buddhist should attend. Once one has 
embarked on the path they are expected to treat their own actions one way and the actions of 
others in a different way. Part of this is due to the nature of the path itself, where (as some 
scholars have argued74) it is one of moral psychological transformation. From the Buddhist 
perspective all ordinary beings are children (bāla) because they are unknowingly compelled by 
greed, hatred, and ignorance, which inevitably lead to suffering. Even though many non-
Buddhists voluntarily endorse actions, provide thoughtful reasons for them, and judge courses of 
action respective to desired ends, as long as these activities are saturated by the self-grasping that 
pervades the typical human experience then these actions will still perpetuate suffering. If one is 
still compelled by the factors that perpetuate suffering, and that person does not even realize it, 
then, for the Buddhist, this person should be approached as a child, not condescendingly but with 
great compassion. For those that are on the path the standards are more stringent. The kid gloves 
are removed when regarding practitioners because it is assumed that practitioners have heard the 
teachings, are engaging in the practices, and are beginning to understand the distinction between 
wholesome and unwholesome mental factors. This understanding and the nascent cultivation of 
certain characteristics correlate to an increase in the freedom valued by Buddhists and also to an 
increase in the moral responsibility associated with this increased freedom. 
So for Meyers the answer to the theoretical problem involves an appeal to the ultimate 
level of dharmas and their interactions with each other. The right sorts of dharmas or mental 
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factors that condition the mental stream from which actions arise constitute, on the conventional 
level, free or unconstrained action. Conversely, other types of dharmas and mental factors that 
condition the same mental stream result in conventionally unfree or constrained action. A 
Buddhist psychological vocabulary via dharma taxonomy provides the specifics of how this 
distinction is made. Meyers states, 
All that liberation requires is for our efforts to make a difference to our future and for the 
causal processes with which we identify to be sensitive and responsive to influence of 
wholesome mental factors or, put another way, for these factors to play a role in the 
mental series (citta-santāna) issuing action.75 
 
Liberation here is the completion of the Buddhist project but the point still holds for what these 
Buddhists would consider more mundane freedom. In addition, the wholesome influences that 
engender a change in the mental series need not initially come from within the series itself. All 
one needs is to be exposed to the teachings and to have a receptive mind with some degree of 
understanding, and this can occur even if one is afflicted by unwholesome mental factors.76  
2.1.4 Jonathan Gold and the Ants 
Jonathan Gold presents a useful analogy that may help illuminate some of the technical 
aspects of this process.77 Gold recounts an anecdote of a time he was staying in Kenya and 
awoke in his hotel room to discover that there appeared to be a new red stripe that went from one 
window up the wall and across the ceiling to another window. He initially thought that his room 
had received some sort of clandestine paintjob while he slept, but upon closer examination he 
found that the stripe was in fact a mass of ants moving from one window to another, a colony 
migration due to rain. Gold saw such regularity in this pattern that he thought it was the result of 
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a skilled painter, but this regularity is due to the physiological factors that underlie ant 
communication and movement. Ants communicate by scent, laying down a pheromone trail each 
time they forage for food. If one finds a promising food source then the ant will double back on 
its path back to the colony strengthening the pheromone trail the second time over. Moreover, if 
additional ants detect these pheromones they follow the trail thereby strengthening it further. 
Shortest paths to food will be the strongest because they have the most ants travelling them. The 
laying down of pheromones by a single ant does not resemble anything like intention on the part 
of the ant, but is just a feature of the ant’s genetic programming and physiology. However, when 
this is applied on a large scale with a colony of ants the result may appear to be something like 
conscious intention, or in Gold’s anecdote the regularity of the stripe on the ceiling of his hotel 
room. 
Using this metaphor Gold suggests that each individual ant could represent a discrete 
dharma in the mental stream (citta-santāna), and the laying down of pheromones as the activity 
of cetanā. Recall cetanā is itself an action that is conditioned but also one that conditions future 
actions. However, many other factors affect cetanā (and here the metaphor may be imperfect) in 
ways that increase tendencies toward or away from some actions. Perhaps these other factors can 
be represented as affecting the relevant strength of the scent laid by each ant. Since cetanā is the 
movement of a mind toward some object and is present in every action (whether conscious or 
not) then these other mental factors help to determine what that object will be. As mentioned 
above, the saṃskāra-skandha refers to all the conditioning factors that play a role in action, and 
this shapes the landscape of possibilities for action. If one is conditioned to steal, perhaps from a 
history of successful theft, then this conditions action in such a way as to increase the possibility 
of that action recurring again. At the very least, this theft-conditioning allows for theft to be a 
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more salient option in the future than it would be for those who have not been similarly 
conditioned. Regarding our ant example then, the pheromone trail may best represent all of these 
conditioning factors, cetanā included, which increase the likelihood of particular actions 
occurring in the future. 
One may object that this seems to confine one to a form of fatalism regarding one’s 
conditioning, for if all action is conditioned in this manner then we would most likely be the 
product of whatever circumstances in which we happened to develop. Or, if all action were like 
the progression of the ant colony then whatever we had done previously would severely delimit 
the horizon of possible action. The Buddha and the subsequent tradition may have been less than 
clear about their stance regarding causal determinism and freedom as it is understood in the 
West, but one area where the Buddha is very explicit is regarding the position of fatalism, which 
he vehemently castigates on several occasions. In the Dīgha Nikāya the Buddha explicitly rails 
against the views of the Ājīvika Makkhali Gosāla who asserted that, 
…purification and defilement were without cause, that nothing is done by oneself 
(attakāra), another (parakāra), or man (purisakāra); that living beings are without power 
(bala and vasa), energy (viriya), steadfastness (thāma), or exertion (parakkama) and 
experience pleasure and pain as the result of fate.78 
 
The Buddha refers to this view as the “most vile” and likens Makkhali Gosāla’s position to a trap 
meant to ensnare men into harm, suffering, and distress.79 The problem with this view is that it 
attacks the notion that one’s efforts can make a difference both to one’s suffering but also to 
one’s liberation, enfeebling meaningful agency. The Buddha’s censure speaks to the importance 
of one’s own efforts in action, but here we face the second problem that Meyers posed, that of 
the incongruence between the ultimately impersonal causal view and the need for some sense of 
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personally effective effort. The Buddha, in his castigation of Gosāla, enforces the psychological 
importance of viewing oneself as an autonomous agent, and again this is implicit within the 
Buddhist path. This brings us back to the second question Meyers posed regarding initiative and 
effort. 
2.1.5 Meyers’s Practical Solution 
Meyers refers to the presupposition of oneself as an autonomous agent as a useful 
delusion because although there is a need to endorse some sort of agency for the Buddhist path to 
get off the ground, strictly speaking the postulation of autonomous agency is not only incorrect 
but also dangerous insofar as it may lead to reifying the self. The idea is that certain attitudes 
once cultivated will lead the practitioner to perfecting higher virtues and progressing along the 
path. For example, shame (hrī) and apprehension (apatrāpya) are endorsed for the purposes of 
cultivating moral discipline, which is instrumental in attaining a calm mind needed to cultivate 
concentration and insight into the nature of reality.80 In this manner the assertion of autonomous 
agency is a means to an end, at the very least one that is required to get individuals to embark on 
the path. However, the path progressively dismantles this sense of autonomous agency as the 
practitioner proceeds along it. The naïve sense of complete autonomy is first undermined through 
the Abhidharma reduction of the person into skandhas and dharmas. Later on the practitioner 
completely drops a sense of self-conscious effort but only after progressing in a particular 
manner whereby certain characteristics and virtues are properly cultivated. It is only after the 
practitioner has been primed in this way that she is ready for such an abdication. As Meyers 
states, 
The impersonal flow of psycho-physical elements must be set on the right course, and 
this requires, at first, alternation between personal and impersonal perspectives, lest the 
view of non-self have the kind of stultifying effect Nagel fears… Thus at first the 
                                                
80 Meyers, “Free Persons,” 63. 
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ultimate perspective must be confined to rarefied moments of deep reflection, meditation, 
and the period just after meditation… Gradually, however, as wholesome habits take hold 
and self-grasping loosens, there is no need for self-conscious effort.81 
 
A common analogy here is that of the virtuoso musician, one who has trained to such a high 
degree that when playing there ceases to be the same conscious effort as perhaps when a 
neophyte struggles through a piece of music. One does not expect the beginner musician to play 
without self-conscious effort nor should one expect the beginning practitioner to skillfully 
implement an understanding of the ultimate impersonal ground of all action. It is the progression 
and structure of the path as well as the cultivation of certain characteristics that prevents this 
impersonal or ultimate viewpoint from becoming debilitating (as for Nagel), and instead allows 
for it to be liberating and therapeutic. 
Some care must be exercised here for what Meyers is postulating is that autonomous 
agency is a useful delusion, not agency full stop. We have seen how Abhidharma understands 
agency as a property of persons that is explicable in terms of certain configurations obtaining at 
the ultimate level. This reductionism is non-eliminativist as it seeks to explain conventional 
agency in terms of more basic dharmas. Given this, then autonomous agency may be considered 
as an example of upāya, ultimately unsupported but necessary for advancement along the 
Buddhist path. The default way of viewing the world includes a deep sense that one is 
autonomous, and this is important so as to not undermine the initiative of would-be and neophyte 
practitioners. So insofar as this delusion of autonomy at least gets someone going along the 
Buddhist path then it is a delusion with benefit for the practitioner. 
Conventionally we are persons who possess agency, but ultimately there exists just 
various flows of psycho-physical processes. Since ethical claims and directives constitute the 
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Buddhist path, the postulation of autonomous agency is deeply fundamental and indicates a 
deployment of upāya at the ground floor of the Abhidharma Buddhist project. 
2.2 Madhyamaka Agency 
Much of Meyers’s project concerning agency endeavors to reconcile the competing 
viewpoints of ultimate and conventional reality, both ontologically and practically. As we have 
seen Madhyamaka jettisons any notion of ultimate reality, removing what Abhidharma 
Buddhism utilizes as a basis for their revisions regarding conventional reality. In considering 
agency within a Madhyamaka framework then, we cannot make any appeals to ultimate reality 
as it is denied. The Mādhyamika can only address this question through the realm of 
conventional truth and dependent origination. The person, whose agency we are chiefly 
concerned, is only a conceptual imputation or convenient designation within Madhyamaka. It is 
not the case that persons do not exist, but rather that the mode of our existence is merely 
conventional and imputed.82 How this framework can explain the agency of the conventional 
person, and how this affects my broader concern about the ethical claims made within 
Madhyamaka will occupy us for the remainder of this chapter.  
2.2.1 Constructed Selves 
Conventional reality involves a three-way correlation between dependent origination, 
emptiness, and conventional identity, so any conventionally identified entity upon analysis 
reveals its emptiness and dependent origination. The sense of self as a conventional entity is no 
different. The primal ignorance that Buddhism seeks to overturn is the reification of the self 
based upon viewing thoughts, feelings, desires, intentions, and a body as entirely one’s own. The 
more these things are taken to be constitutive of a “self” the more the self becomes a feature of 
how that individual interprets and maneuvers through the world, perpetuating the fundamental 
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ignorance. However, as Garfield points out this is not solely an activity of the individual, he 
states, 
None of us is innocent in our own creation; but at the same time none of us is 
autonomous in that creative activity. Our identities are negotiated, fluid, and complex in 
virtue of being marked by the three universal characteristics of impermanence, 
interdependence, and the absence of any self.83 
 
The appropriation of various mental states and a body as one’s own may be deep psychological 
habits that occur below the level of conscious thought. However, it does seem that at the 
conscious level we weave narratives about our own reasons, motivations, and actions, and that 
others also contribute to this narrative through their similar attributions. This is similar to Daniel 
Dennett’s description of the sense of self as a “narrative center of gravity,”84 fictional but utilized 
for various ends, just as the center of gravity in a physical object. Individual persons are defined 
then through the narratives that are woven both by them and others. Since there is no deep 
metaphysical fact of the matter to which descriptions align, then there is no robust metaphysical 
distinction that differentiates one individual from another. Moreover, the emphasis on narratives 
is how Garfield explains the Madhyamaka understanding of human action solely within the 
realm of conventional reality. To act is to engage in some behavior for some reasons or motives 
that we (and others) take to be our own, because that is all it can be in the absence of ultimate 
reality. Garfield states, 
On a Madhyamaka understanding, it is therefore for the causes of our behavior to be a 
part of the narrative that makes sense of our lives, as opposed to being simply the part of 
the vast uninterpreted milieu in which our lives are led, or bits of the narratives that 
properly constitute the lives of others.85 
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84 Daniel Dennett, “The Self as Narrative Center of Gravity,” in Self and Consciousness: Multiple 
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As mentioned, some parts of these narratives are likely deep psychological habits, but much may 
be a matter of choice, and if this is so then the narratives we spin about ourselves and others are 
constrained by explanation. I interpret the particular action of a particular individual in terms of 
the narrative that has been constructed through the interactions of that individual and others. 
Garfield provides an example of defenestration that illustrates some of this process. In 
one case I am troubled by the current political situation, the climate, and other social woes, I 
therefore decide to end it all by jumping through a window at the twelfth floor. In a different 
case, despite my existential struggling, someone else physically tosses me through the window. 
In the former case there are cognitive and emotional states that motivate my act, which I, and 
those that know me, would regard as my own. The narrative that constructs the conventional self 
upon which I am individuated then includes these aspects. Hence this is uncontroversially an 
action.86 In the latter case the causes of my flight are clearly a part of the narrative of the one 
who tosses me out. On conventional grounds the cause of my being thrown through the window 
lies within the one throwing me because it is the most plausible narrative in this scenario.87 
Garfield does mention a more difficult case of coercion, whereby I am forced to jump lest my 
children suffer torture. Here it may be that multiple narratives can be constructed that each assign 
agency to either myself or the one coercing me. How one chooses a narrative especially in cases 
where agency is a matter of dispute becomes a more difficult problem, but one that Garfield 
avoids answering directly. However, he highlights the point that when we do compare narratives, 
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87 The possibility of multiple narratives does not necessarily mean that all narratives are equally good. As 
Garfield mentions, “It is possible for people to disagree about whether a particular event is an action or not, or about 
the attribution of responsibility. It is possible for us to wonder about whether we should feel remorse for a particular 
situation or not. These questions are in the end, on this account, questions about which narratives make the most 
sense. While these questions may not always be easy (or even possible to settle), the fact that they arise saves this 
view from facile relativism that would issue from the observation that we can always tell some story on which this is 
an action of mine, and some story on which it is not, and so that there is simply no fact of the matter, and perhaps no 
importance to the question.” Garfield “Just Another,” 181, fn. 10 
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or try to best tell the story, we need not (and in fact, do not) look for a “will” or some 
metaphysically robust agent at all.  
2.2.2 Beneficial Authorship 
 Conventionally we experience the pull of different motives and the consideration of 
alternative reasons before we engage in some action. Whatever motives and reasons are the 
strongest or most dominant result in some particular action occurring. Moreover, these motives 
and reasons are the result of background psychological dispositions as well as other cognitive 
and conative factors (recall the various mental factors that condition action within the 
Abhidharma framework). The Buddhist project at large describes some actions as being 
expressive of and conducive to happiness, tranquility, and the welfare of others, and so these are 
considered praiseworthy or wholesome, whereas other actions do not express nor are conducive 
to these same sorts of things, and are therefore not praiseworthy or wholesome.88 It seems that 
this is all that is needed for moral assessment in Madhyamaka as some alignment with ultimate 
reality is unavailable. Since the self is a conceptual imputation deeply connected to a narrative, 
change can occur when that narrative is altered. The malleability of the narrative and hence of 
the self is a feature rather than a bug for we can author a narrative that has a more virtuous self as 
the protagonist. It may be the case that I am currently motivated and conditioned by a set of 
unwholesome and unbeneficial factors such as greed, anger, fear, etc. yet I can imagine a 
narrative where I am instead motivated by compassion, joy, generosity, and the like. What the 
Buddhist path does within the Madhyamaka framework is endorse the cultivation of these 
conditions such that one will incrementally increase their wholesome conditioning while 
diminishing their unwholesome conditioning. This all occurs without recourse to an ultimate 
metaphysical story. Conventionally we understand our actions to arise from our own motivations 
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and reasons, which in turn are the result of our background psychological dispositions. A 
practitioner pursues the path by training her dispositions and altering her psychology such that 
her motivations and reasons change as well. The path then becomes a calculated and effortful 
endeavor to rewrite one’s own narrative toward a more beneficial end. However, this is not a 
freewheeling constructive endeavor, this occurs at the conventional level, the realm of dependent 
origination, and that is what constrains this activity. One can explain a positive change that they 
are trying to enact by explaining that they have had an epiphany regarding their behavior, or an 
encounter that led to a deep look at their current way of life. In this manner, reconstruction is 
explanatorily constrained within the realm of dependent origination.  
Buddhist virtues such as generosity, compassion, joy, loving kindness etc. are constituted 
by particular actions regarding the mind, speech, and the body. If moral assessment in 
Madhyamaka is a matter of determining which actions do or do not express and facilitate such 
virtues then all action may be evaluated morally. Such action requires agency, but here it is in the 
conventional sense of an individual’s narrative that is sensitive to explanatory purposes. Again, 
this cannot conflict with some ultimate metaphysical reality in Madhyamaka. Moreover, if we 
understand agency in this narrative sense then there is no robust agent being asserted at all so the 
Mādhyamika also dodges conflict with the doctrine of non-self.  
However, what I have been explaining is agency as it is understood within a 
Madhyamaka framework, and this is not necessarily how most people understand their own 
actions. Part of the primal delusion that fuels suffering is viewing oneself as an autonomous and 
substantial “self’. Most individuals think that they have autonomy in most matters (when not 
constrained or compelled in obvious ways) and understand their own narratives in these terms. “I 
chose to do X because I wanted to, but I could have done Y as well.” Like Abhidharma, 
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Madhyamaka first dismantles this autonomous sense of the self, but not through appeals to 
ultimate reality, rather through a proper understanding of the three-way correlation of dependent 
origination, emptiness, and conventional identity. The Mādhyamika may then explain how non-
autonomous agency can operate through the public and private construction of narratives 
explanatorily constrained.  
Here is where it seems that both the Ābhidharmika and Mādhyamika are in agreement, 
for both may view robust autonomous agency as an exercise in upāya-kauśalya. The default 
position people find themselves in includes a deep sense that one is an autonomous entity acting 
freely. This sense helps would be practitioners on either side engage with Buddhist teachings and 
embark upon the Buddhist path to awakening. It is in the best interest of the practitioners that the 
first teaching they are exposed to is not regarding their lack of autonomy as this quickly may 
lead to the enervating effects of fatalism or the paralysis described by Nagel. Although both 
branches would hold that the road to perpetual suffering is paved with this sense of autonomy, 
when framed within a particular path so it can be progressively dismantled, this sense is a 
requirement for advancing along the path.    
2.3 Summary 
 Both Abhidharma and Madhyamaka Buddhist paths require a revision of one’s practices, 
such that a practitioner must alter her actions of mind, speech and body in accordance with the 
particular path outlined by each branch. This is a futile endeavor if there is no way for our efforts 
to result in meaningful change, so agency cannot be entirely discarded within the Buddhist 
project. Although both Abhidharma and Madhyamaka have ways to explain conventional 
agency, significantly this agency is not of the autonomous kind. Abhidharma explains 
conventional agency as consisting in the particular relations of particular types of dharmas at the 
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ultimate level. Madhyamaka explains conventional agency as public and private narrative 
construction explanatorily constrained by dependent origination. The typical assertion of oneself 
as an autonomous agent is part of what the Buddhist path seeks to overturn, but this is executed 
in a systematic and particular manner, whereby the practitioner progressively transforms her 
psychology and gradually relinquishes self-grasping. The claims that the Buddhist path makes 
(in either branch) at some point require holding onto this false and generally dangerous (insofar 
as it leads to suffering) autonomous sense of self, and this is why it may be considered as a form 







 Without recourse to ultimate reality to justify and ground truth claims Madhyamaka faces 
what Tom Tillemans has termed “the dismal slough”.89 This is the notion that conventional truths 
fall into unreliability and extreme relativism. He presents this as a consequence of a view 
tentatively attributed to Candrakīrti, a prominent philosophical figure in Tibetan Madhyamaka.90 
He is said to endorse a lokaprasiddha view of truth due to his endorsement of this passage, 
 The world (loka) argues with me. I do not argue with the world. What is agreed upon 
(saṃmata) in the world to exist, I too agree that it exists. What is agreed upon in the 
world to be nonexistent, I too agree that it does not exist.91 
 
The lokaprasiddha view of truth understands what is acknowledged by the world to be the sole 
criterion for truth and knowledge. This is devastating for truth because the reasoned claims of 
experts, say in the science community, as well as the opinions of the average person on the street, 
can obviously be unreliable. It may have been cutting edge science at one point to accept the 
existence of phlogiston only to find out that the compounds at work in combustion included no 
such thing. If this unreliability affects experts, then the average person on the street falls prey as 
well. Furthermore, if all there is to truth are the opinions or beliefs of any person you choose, 
then there is nothing that can establish the actual fact of the matter. There is no privileged 
account of how things are because any criticism would be just another opinion, and there would 
be no way to revise or reject claims. This leads to conservatism and quietism where one has no 
epistemic duty other than to consistency within the set of one’s beliefs; what is believed is taken 
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as true and there remains no reason to question it. Normativity is reduced to mere consistency 
internal to a set of one’s opinions and beliefs, and there becomes no way to say why something is 
the way that it is thereby making justification normatively impotent as well. Koji Tanaka writes 
that the dismal slough, “…flattens out any meaningful distinction between truth and falsity that 
can be relied upon to acquire knowledge.”92 This is devastating for epistemology but it also 
means that a robust distinction between good and bad conduct becomes quite blurry. The 
Buddhist path is fundamentally a revisionary project concerned with conduct93 so this muddling 
of the distinction between good and bad conduct appears to threaten or undermine the basic 
Buddhist project. Now it is not certain that Candrakīrti actually held this view, nor is it certain 
that most Mādhyamikas hold this view. However, since Tanaka has detailed how the 
lokaprasiddha view can be derived from Nāgārjuna’s discussion of the two truths and emptiness 
in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā94, a justification of ethical claims while maintaining 
Madhyamaka constraints becomes a pressing matter95.  
My tentative suggestion in chapter one regards another concept found in Buddhist 
philosophy, upāya-kauśalya. This is typically translated as “skillful means” and originally 
concerned the pedagogical ability of the Buddha when addressing audiences of differing spiritual 
development. In essence, upāya means utilizing various ways to facilitate the practitioner’s 
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progress along the Buddhist path. Certain concepts or ideas may be emphasized (or at least, not 
discarded) because the one receiving these ideas would expedite their progress along the 
Buddhist path having heard such concept presented in such a manner. These ideas or concepts 
may not be true from the perspective of an enlightened being, so in this sense may be viewed as 
deceptive to some degree, yet they are particularly expedient for the practitioner absorbing them. 
Situating truth and normativity as such situates these ethical claims within a Buddhist plan of 
action directed towards a goal. For example, the force behind the directive to cultivate generosity 
(dāna) comes from the instrumental nature of this directive within the path towards awakening.96 
Part of this understanding relies upon the fact that the path to awakening, as it is characterized in 
Mahāyāna Buddhism (of which Madhyamaka is a part), consists of various characteristics or 
perfections (parāmitas) that are meant to be cultivated, and that mutually support one another. 
Considering ethical claims within Madhyamaka as a form of upāya indicates that these directives 
all point towards a distinct goal but are not ultimately grounded in a robust ontological manner as 
they are in Abhidharma, nor are these claims strictly endorsed as ultimate or settled truth claims 
by an enlightened being.  
 In this chapter I will delve deeper into the use of upāya in giving normative weight to the 
ethical directives within Madhyamaka. Given the focus on the conventional within Madhyamaka 
I will first look into the notion of conventional truth for a Mādhyamika, suggesting a promising 
way to view truth, primarily in terms of function rather than definitional properties. This chiefly 
involves an account of truth articulated by Huw Price that I think is particularly agreeable to 
Madhyamaka commitments. Turning to more mainstream Buddhist epistemology demonstrates 
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the importance of practice in knowledge acquisition and conventional truth claims. This in turn 
helps to support my postulation of upāya as a way to situate normativity for the ethical claims 
made within Madhyamaka. 
3.1 Huw Price and Frictional Truth  
Many positions regarding truth attempt to explain truth by asking what truth is, or what it 
is that makes true statements true. The Madhyamaka assertion of universal emptiness and their 
rejection of essentialist notions greatly narrow the field of positions about truth to which a 
Mādhyamika could appeal. In his “Truth as Convenient Friction” Huw Price argues for a 
particular way of viewing truth that is not easily found on the map of positions relating to truth, 
realism, and meaning.97 Price’s account appears to be a particularly useful way of articulating an 
understanding of conventional truth for a Mādhyamika.  
Price’s article first mentions Richard Rorty as holding the position that truth is nothing 
beyond justification. That is, when we speak of some statement being true what we mean is that 
that statement is justified in some particularly robust manner. Rorty self-identifies as a 
pragmatist and his position allegedly derives from pragmatist principles. He states,  
Pragmatists think that if something makes no difference to practice, it should make no 
difference to philosophy. This conviction makes them suspicious of the distinction 
between justification and truth, for that distinction makes no difference to my decisions 
about what to do.98 
 
Rorty sees the distinction between truth and justification as making no behavioral difference and 
therefore, presumably for principles of parsimony, he rejects truth in favor of justification. 
Notwithstanding whether or not Rorty’s position is an accurate representation of pragmatism, 
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Price asserts that there would indeed be a behavioral difference if a community of language users 
really did not have any notion of truth, and held only justification as normative.  
Price holds that insofar as truth exists, it exists as a norm that is central to the linguistic 
practices in which we are engaged. What is important is that the language users of a community 
feel as though they are beholden to this norm and not whether or not the norm has some sort of 
metaphysical existence (the latter point being a discussion not particularly fruitful, though more 
about this later on). Price describes truth as the third of three norms of increasing strength that 
constrain discourse for communities of language users. He describes them in negative terms so 
as to illuminate the censure that applies when assertions are made among speakers.  
The first norm is subjective assertibility, that is, a speaker would be incorrect to assert 
that p if she did not believe that p; to assert p in these circumstances provides the speaker’s peers 
with prima facie grounds for censure, or disapprobation99. In other words, sincerity restricts what 
a speaker would and would not utter. Price mentions that this is divorced from a notion of truth 
and the easiest way to see this is through the example of utterances we do not take to be truth apt. 
For example, it would be incorrect for Susan to request a cup of coffee if Susan did not in fact 
want a cup of coffee.100 Moreover, the community in which Susan was a part would hold her to 
be incorrect for asserting that she wanted a cup of coffee if she in fact did not. The second norm 
is that of (personal) warranted assertibility, that is, a speaker would be incorrect to assert that p if 
she does not have adequate (personal) grounds for believing that p; to assert that p in these 
circumstances provides the speaker’s peers with prima facie grounds for censure.101 Again, this 
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is distinct from truth as some realists will ensure that even though Susan believes that p, and is 
personally justified in believing that p, p may still be false. Yet even those “pragmatists” such as 
Rorty do not have a notion of personal justification in mind when they collapse truth into 
justification. Rather, they have some sort of objective, community-based variant whereby p is 
justified if it coheres with the other beliefs of a community.102 Price is arguing for the existence 
of truth as a norm distinct from sincerity and justification, and this is partly the reason why he 
cashes out justification personally. If the Rorty-style pragmatist does not think that truth exists as 
a norm beyond sincerity and justification then the idea that a belief improves when it is justified 
according to the beliefs of a larger community starts to look incoherent. That is, unless May 
recognizes some sort of norm of truth (beyond sincerity and justification) then the idea that her 
views might improve through consultation with the wider community does not make sense. Price 
states, “It would be as if we gave a student full marks in an exam, and then told him that he 
would have done better if his answers had agreed with those of other students.”103 If for some 
reason the “pragmatist” feels inclined to follow Peirce and identify truth with justification at the 
end of an ideal limit of inquiry, Price has a response to this as well. His response indicates how 
his approach to truth remains pragmatic yet differs from other pragmatist theories of truth. 
Instead of identifying truth with increasingly sophisticated notions of justification for Price the 
better move for the pragmatist is:  
…to resist the pressure to identify truth with anything – in other words, simply reject the 
assumption that an adequate philosophical account of truth needs to answer the question, 
‘What is truth?’. Better questions for the pragmatist to ask are the explanatory ones: Why 
do we have such a notion? What job does it do in language? What features does it need to 
have to play this role? And how would things be different if we did not have it?104 





104 Ibid, 175. 
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Insofar as the pragmatic theory of truth states that truth is just warranted assertibility for one 
person, across an actual community, or at an ideal end of inquiry, or whether truth is just that 
which expedites practice, then Price’s account of truth is not a traditionally pragmatist one. Yet 
Price’s concern for explanatory questions within our actual practice seems to warrant his 
account’s inclusion under a pragmatist heading.  
 The notion that improvement of our beliefs makes sense only when we are subject to the 
norm of truth is what Price calls the passive account of the role of the truth norm, but this norm 
also has an active role. Price explains,  
The third norm does not just hold open the conceptual space for the idea of improvement. 
It positively encourages such improvement, by motivating speakers who disagree to try 
and resolve their disagreement.105 
  
Without truth all disagreement would become like differences of opinion, inconsequential and 
lacking urgency for resolution. In a community without the norm of truth all assertions are 
merely opinionated assertions or MOAs. Such a community (Mo’ans, as Price calls them) would 
express disapprobation only if a speaker asserted that ~p if she really believed that p (the norm of 
sincerity), or if she asserted that p without any personal justification for believing that p (the 
norm of justification). But this is where the disapproval ends for the Mo’ans, for without truth 
operating as a norm they do not treat a disagreement between two speakers as an indication that 
one is mistaken; disagreement is always of a no-fault kind.106 If the Mo’ans were to adopt the 
third norm of truth then this would require them to ascribe fault to anyone that asserted ~p when 
they themselves asserted that p, independent of any fault through violation of the first two norms. 
                                                
105 Ibid. 
 
106 Price’s argument does not rely on whether or not a linguistic practice like that of the Mo’ans is actually 
possible. The example is meant to clearly show what the norm of truth brings to linguistic practice. Price, “Truth 
as,” 177-179. 
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What happens is that disagreement itself becomes grounds for disapproval, because the 
disagreement itself indicates that one’s interlocutor has fallen short of a normative standard.107  
The cost (as Price puts it) of this third norm is a general disposition to seek the approval 
of our fellow speakers, as well as a more particular disposition to disapprove of speakers with 
whom we disagree. This disposition connects motivation to approval and disapproval, whereas 
the norm of truth connects disagreement to disapproval and successful argument and agreement 
to approval. Price emphasizes that it is disapproval that motivates speakers not the disagreement 
itself. This is because, for example, if the Mo’ans did not care about disagreements when only 
operating under the first two norms then why would it suddenly bother them when trying to 
implement the third norm? Price is tentative in is explanation, 
Insofar – so very far, in my view – as terms such as ‘true’ and ‘false’ carry this normative 
force in natural languages, they must be giving voice to something more basic: a 
fundamental practice of expressions of attitudes of approval and disapproval, in response 
to perceptions of agreement and disagreement between expressed commitments.108 
 
Price also mentions that there seems to be a primitive incompatibility between certain behavioral 
commitments of an individual such that one cannot do and not do a particular action e.g. Susan 
cannot both have and not have a cup of coffee.109 Perhaps this is the most basic level of approval 
or disapproval whereby perceived incompatibility is what determines disapproval, and perceived 
compatibility what determines approval. In any case, Price’s main point here is that truth 
operates as the third norm both passively and actively as described. 
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Price notes that the norm of truth provides a sort of friction that characterizes factual 
dialogue.110 This friction comes about when speakers find themselves concerned with and 
motivated by disagreement via disapproval. The disagreement, subsequent argument and 
agreement are taken by Price to be generally beneficial for a community that is beholden to the 
third norm, as opposed to a community such as the Mo’ans. Tipping his pragmatist hand, Price is 
interested in the practical implications of the notions of truth and falsity. He first indicates that 
truth and falsity make our linguistic practice genuinely (or perhaps robustly) assertoric in nature 
rather than the merely opinionated assertions of the Mo’ans. Pressing the practical difference 
question further he states that the subsequent approval or disapproval that comes with genuine 
assertions bound to the third norm, encourages dialogue through the drive to resolve 
disagreement. The importance of this third norm seems to bottom out in an assumption (or 
gamble as he puts it) that there generally seems to be long run advantages in the pooling of 
cognitive resources and agreement on shared projects.111 Moreover, the third norm has the 
distinct behavioral consequence of actual dialogue, rather than the freewheeling arena of sincere 
and justified “assertions” found among the Mo’ans. This dialogue is brought about by the 
disposition of speakers to criticize, or at least disapprove of, those with whom they disagree, and 
this is the behavioral difference that Price, contra Rorty, thinks marks a community that accepts 
the third norm over a community that does not. 
3.2 Mādhyamikas as Priceans or Price as a Closet Mādhyamika?  
As mentioned, Price refers to his approach as a pragmatist one because he is concerned 
with the function of truth in human discourse. His account seeks to answer what it is that truth 
                                                
110 He pithily remarks, “Truth is the grit that makes our individual opinions engage with one another. Truth 
puts the cogs in cognition, at least in its public manifestations.” Price, “Truth as,” 169. 
 
111 Price, “Truth as,” 183. 
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does for speakers and what discourse would be like if we did not possess truth. He chooses to 
approach truth in this way not just for novelty, but because he is unconcerned with questions that 
start from the supposition that truth has a metaphysical status of some sort, whether that is 
robustly real or unreal. He mentions (quite rightly I think) that it is a uniquely difficult problem 
to articulate for the issue of the metaphysical status of truth is enmeshed with the terms of the 
problem because metaphysical conclusions tend to be cast in semantic terms.112 Price states,  
In my view the right response to this is not to think ... that we thereby have a 
transcendental argument for semantic realism. Without an intelligible denial, realism is 
no more intelligible than antirealism. The right response – as Rorty himself in any case 
urges – is to be suspicious of the realist-antirealist debate itself. … We should reject the 
metaphysical stance not by rejecting truth and representation, but by recognizing that in 
virtue of the most plausible story about the function and origins of these notions they do 
not sustain that sort of metaphysical weight.113 
 
Although Price agrees with many disquotationalist minimalists that truth is not a substantial 
property, metaphysically speaking, he does not think that truth is merely a grammatical device 
for disquotation.114 For Price the functional question of truth is primary and he thinks that once 
this question is answered there is no further question of philosophical interest to be asked 
regarding truth. He knowingly rejects the paradigm that encompasses almost all discussions of 
truth in favor of a functional analysis that metaphysically deflates truth. This maneuver is 
reminiscent of Nāgārjuna’s approach to metaphysics mentioned in chapter one. There I discussed 
that Nāgārjuna endeavored to carve out a defensible position that rejected the entire metaphysical 
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114 Briefly, according to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the 
statement itself. For example, to say that “snow is white” is true (or that it is true that snow is white) is equivalent to 
saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly 
about the truth of “snow is white”. Disquotationalism is a variety of deflationism named as such due to how the 
significance of a statement’s truth is given simply by removing the quotation marks e.g. [“snow is white” is true] 
becomes [snow is white]. Daniel Stoljar and Nic Damnjanovic, "The Deflationary Theory of Truth", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/truth-deflationary/>. 
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paradigm that characterized contemporaneous positions by rejecting the presupposition of 
svabhāva. His arguments are meant to illustrate the incoherence of svabhāva when asserted as 
foundational for existence. He also defended the charge that by denying svabhāva he was 
denying existence and thereby falling into nihilism, a charge that (on his view) can only land 
when svabhāva is held as a necessary condition for existence. Here then is a striking similarity 
between an Indian philosopher operating between the second and third centuries CE and an 
analytic philosopher of the contemporary West. Madhyamaka as a distinct philosophical position 
is distinguished by the universal application of emptiness (śūnyatā), that everything is empty of, 
or does not possess, inherent existence (svabhāva). This is typically understood as a form of anti-
essentialism or anti-realism, yet this latter description may be misleading if the entire paradigm 
of realism-antirealism is what Nāgārjuna rejects. Nevertheless, Price’s rejection of the 
metaphysical stance as well as an approach to truth that seeks to analyze it as something is very 
similar to the Madhyamaka rejection of svabhāva and robust essentialist definitions.  
If some phenomenon exhibits some sort of dependency then according to Madhyamaka, 
that phenomenon is empty. Price’s approach to truth looks at its genealogy and function in 
human discourse, and he does admit that in some sense truth (when metaphysically inflated) is a 
myth, or at least human creation.115 This illustrates that truth is dependent upon human discourse 
for the particular type of existence that it has, that it is not some ontologically robust feature of 
the universe. Truth arises in dependence upon human discourse, and has an identity in virtue of 
conventional verbal designation. That which arises in dependence upon causes and conditions 
and is conventionally designated is empty according to Madhyamaka. Price’s truth, then, is 
empty and stands inside the three-way correlation of dependent origination, conventional 
designation, and emptiness that characterizes all phenomena for Madhyamaka. 
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3.3 Conventional Truth and Falsity. 
 I think Price’s approach is a plausible and helpful way to think about conventional truth 
within a Madhyamaka framework. From the standpoint of conventional reality it may very well 
be the case that pooled cognitive resources and shared goals are taken to be generally beneficial, 
insofar as the benefit is successful practice and maneuvering through the world. In speaking of 
conventional truth here as functional along Price’s lines I mean truth that obtains within 
conventional reality, as opposed to truth about conventional reality. For the Mādhyamika the 
latter concerns the truth of emptiness, dependent origination, and conventional identity, whereas 
the former concerns the truths that (while being empty) constitute the shared experience of 
conventional reality. Apprehending the truths within conventional reality is vital to successful 
navigation through the world, and in this way I think Price’s account offers a plausible way to 
situate truth without countenancing additional metaphysical baggage. A brief foray into Buddhist 
epistemology will indicate a focus on practical efficacy as a way to obtain validity for the truths 
within conventional reality. 
A typical example used in demonstrating truth and falsity within conventional reality is 
that of a rope mistaken for a snake. To say that the rope is a snake is conventionally incorrect for 
within the realm of conventional reality the term “snake” does not apply to the phenomenon of 
the rope (insofar as one is speaking standard English). More importantly, conventionally real 
phenomena have actual causes and effects, whereas conventional falsities do not. The Tibetan 
commentator Tsongkhapa makes this point in his commentary to Nāgārjuna’s MMK,  
However, if there were no place for conventional phenomena, the existence of which is 
established by authoritative cognition, those phenomena would be like the snake – that is, 
the rope grasped as a snake – of which no cause or effect is possible…116  
  
                                                
116 Tsongkhapa, Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 
Translated by Geshe Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 30-31.  
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Tsongkhapa’s mention of “authoritative cognition” points to a central issue within Indian 
epistemology and refers to one of various epistemic instruments that correctly or reliably present 
their epistemic objects.  
In traditional Indian epistemology, as in western epistemology, a central question regards 
the nature of knowledge. The Sanskrit analogues closest to the term “knowledge” are pramā and 
pramāṇa. Georges Dreyfus explains, 
These technical words are derived from the root mā, to measure or cognize, and the 
prefix pra indicating excellence or perfection. The word pramā designates a state of 
being factually aware of something, and should be literally translated as “knowledge 
event.” The adjunction of the suffix ana makes the word pramāṇa, which literally 
signifies the means or instrument of bringing about the knowledge event (pramā).117 
 
There are two important differences between the Western concept of knowledge and pramā. 
First, pramā does not refer to an enduring quality of knowing but rather an individual event of 
knowing. Indian and Tibetan philosophers understood knowledge as a succession of knowing 
events that arise and, once they pass, the traces of the knowing event are what lead to 
recollection.118 Second, whereas Western knowledge is typically characterized in terms of belief, 
pramā is analyzed in terms of certainty. That is, pramā or pramāṇa are able to lead to the correct 
identification of the object and generate certainty with regards to it.119  
Dignāga and his successor Dharmakīrti, operative in the fifth to sixth centuries CE, are 
chiefly responsible for developing and refining the Buddhist approach to epistemology and logic. 
Dharmakīrti accepts only two pramāṇas as valid, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference 
(anumāna). Valid here specifically means nondeceptive, as Dharmakīrti writes, “Valid cognition 
                                                
117 George B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 287-288. 
 




is that cognition [which is] nondeceptive. [Nondeceptiveness consists] in the readiness [for the 
object] to perform a function.”120 This readiness refers to the causal implications of an object. 
That is, an object is non-deceptive if it accords with the expected causal regularities attributed to 
it. The later commentator Dharmottara emphasizes this practical nature of nondeceptiveness, 
where it is the potential results of the cognition that determine its validity. Dreyfus explains,  
A cognition is nondeceptive inasmuch as it has the ability to bring about the appropriate 
possible practical results. For example, a perception of fire is valid inasmuch as it enables 
us to deal with the fire in the appropriate way (appropriateness here being a contextual 
notion). This nondeceptiveness is understood in a causal way: It is the result of the mental 
episode’s causal connection with reality and in turn leads to the appropriate causal 
results.121  
 
These potential practical implications can also be understood as a type of reliability. The 
apprehension of a vase is nondeceptive if we see that it reliably holds water and flowers as we 
expected. Yet this reliability does seem to require some amount of previous experience so as to 
have some expectations for the apprehended object to meet or not meet. However, it is not 
practical efficacy alone that constitutes nondeceptiveness, as other Tibetan thinkers stress an 
additional (although less emphasized) intentional aspect coupled with the practical. The 
intentional aspect refers to the cognition’s correct identification of the object in a manner that is 
not contradicted by other cognitions.122 So the cognition of a bicycle is nondeceptive (and 
therefore valid) when the bicycle seems to exhibit the causal connections appropriate to a bicycle 
(it functions as a bicycle should etc) and when we correctly apprehend the bicycle as a bicycle 
rather than a scooter or horse.  
 Dharmakīrti’s limitation of pramāṇas to perception and inference allows only two objects 
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of knowledge (prameya) through these means. For him perception apprehends only bare 
particulars or svalakṣaṇas, whereas inference apprehends universals or sāmānyalakṣaṇas. The 
particular apprehended by perception is the first contact with the world that gives rise to a 
knowledge event. So when I see something the bare particular is that which impinges upon my 
senses immediately prior to any conceptualizing activity. Dharmakīrti regards any 
conceptualizing activity as inference and any object of inference is considered a universal. So if I 
have a perceptual event that I come later to understand as the seeing of a blue flower the moment 
that I conceptualize my sensory input and understand the percept as that of a blue flower I am 
conceptualizing and therefore dealing in universals. Up to that point it is the bare particular that 
causally impinges upon me and leads the perceptual event.  
Dharmakīrti’s metaphysical view is thoroughly nominalist and denies robust existence to 
universals, asserting that only bare particulars are real and causally efficacious. This indicates a 
type of foundationalism whereby the particulars are what the superstructure of higher cognition 
and thought are built.123 The distinction between the two truths maps onto this ontological 
dichotomy with particulars as ultimately real and universals as conventionally or conceptually 
real. The Mādhyamika would disagree with Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics regarding the ultimate 
reality of particulars, but this leads back to the question of how, when limited to conventional 
reality, we can determine which cognitions are authoritative. Despite the fact that Nāgārjuna 
predates Dharmakīrti, he seems to indicate a similar reliability criterion for authoritative 
cognition. In his Vigrahavyāvartanī (The Dispeller of Disputes) Nāgārjuna seems to defend the 
mutual cohesion of instruments of knowledge and objects of knowledge. In this manner, certain 
pre-theoretical beliefs about objects initially appear to be reliable and we use them to test 
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assumptions about our instruments of knowledge. These instruments are then used to refine our 
beliefs about objects. After which these objects can be used to justify further instruments of 
knowledge of further objects etc.124 Jan Westerhoff repackages Otto Neurath’s metaphor125 to 
explain, 
Like people finding some planks on the seashore, we build a boat to cross the ocean, and 
once we are afloat we find new planks in the sea that we use to expand and repair our 
boat. Our boat does not depend essentially on the first planks we used; similarly, our 
theory does not depend essentially on our first unquestioned assumptions. Both may be 
replaced and discarded at some point in the process without the whole system ceasing to 
be functional.126  
 
For the Mādhyamika neither the instruments of knowledge nor the objects of knowledge are 
foundational to the knowledge acquisition process. The function that Westerhoff alludes to here 
seems to be successful knowledge acquisition in light of ones successful practice in the world. 
Both the instruments of knowledge and the objects of knowledge that are delivered are fallible 
and up for revision in light of how successful they are, and this can only be determined by how 
effective they prove to be in orienting oneself within or maneuvering through conventional 
reality. This is quite similar to the causal or practical efficacy found in Dharmakīrti’s 
epistemology, but without the troublesome metaphysics. It seems quite plausible, then, that the 
thread of functionally or casually efficacious epistemic practice runs throughout Buddhist 
epistemology.  
Tsongkhapa above emphasized that conventional truths are causally efficacious and 
conventionally falsities are not. Recall in chapter one that the Mādhyamika does not deny casual 
relationships, just the presupposition that causation requires svabhāva. Candrakīrti says that if 
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there was no causation whatsoever then everything could arise from anything and people would 
not be able to succeed in relatively straightforward projects such as farming because this act 
requires some causal regularity in regards to seeds producing sprouts under favorable conditions 
etc. This, along with the mutually reinforcing system of instruments of knowledge and objects of 
knowledge, appears to indicate an approach to truth and falsity deeply connected to practice 
within conventional reality. Conventional truth is sifted from conventional falsehood through the 
use of instruments of knowledge that derive their authority through a sort of mutual equilibrium 
between these instruments and their objects of knowledge. The whole process is sensitive to 
experience and the function seems to be promotion of successful maneuvering through 
conventional reality. If I grasp a snake believing it to be a rope a subsequent bite will cause me to 
realize the error of my belief, and if I believe the rope to be a snake then I cannot utilize it in 
fastening freight to my oxcart. Given the constraints of the Madhyamaka philosophical position 
it seems plausible that practical orientation through experience plays a significant role in 
determining authoritative cognition and therefore sifting conventional truth from conventional 
falsity.  
3.4 Ethical Truth and Falsity Considered as Upāya 
 I think that this is a plausible approach to conventional truth generally, but the ethical 
truths with which I am concerned can be considered a subset of this. My postulation is that 
ethical truths in Madhyamaka obtain their normativity in a similar manner as conventional truths 
outlined above, and that this is best understood as a form of upāya-kauśalya. Recall that upāya-
kauśalya translates to “skillful means” and this invites one to ask what it is a means to, or for. In 
the present case I am suggesting that it is a means to successful operation within conventional 
reality specifically while reducing suffering and progressing along the path to awakening. This is 
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a narrower and more specialized function than the truths of conventional reality, one that is 
deeply connected to the soteriological goals of Buddhism rather than the truths that constitute 
conventional reality. Ethical truth, then, would be those claims or directives that are meant to 
advance the practitioner along the path, while ethical falsity would be those claims that obstruct 
progress along the path or actively prohibit possible advancements. So in this sense the 
normative weight for ethical claims within Madhyamaka does not come from some sort of 
correspondence to an ultimate ontological realm but from how effectively the ethical claims lead 
one to a deeply transformed way of being in the world.  
Some specifics may prove helpful in seeing how this could work. Madhyamaka is a 
school within the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition and the principal explanation of the path toward 
awakening within this tradition concerns the moral ideal of the bodhisattva, or Buddhist moral 
saint. This is a being that has cultivated bodhicitta, typically translated as “awakened mind” or 
“awakening mind”. Bodhicitta is a complex psychological state, essentially a standing 
motivational state with affective and conative dimensions that principally involves a 
compassionate, altruistic127 aspiration to supremely develop oneself morally – to become 
awakened – for the benefit of others.128 The framework of the Mahāyāna path (sometimes called 
the path of the bodhisattva) is typically structured around six perfections or virtues (pāramitās); 
these are generosity (dāna), moral discipline (śīla), patience (kṣānti), energy or vigor (vīrya), 
meditation (dhyāna), and wisdom (prajñā). These are all undergirded with a thoroughgoing 
emphasis on compassion (karunā) that characterizes the Mahāyāna path. One of the most 
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128 Jay Garfield, “What Is It Like to be a Bodhisattva? Moral Phenomenology in Śāntideva’s 
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influential Buddhist texts in Tibet, where it is regarded as principal source of Mahāyāna ethical 
thought, is the Bodhicaryāvatāra or A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life by Śāntideva 
composed sometime during the eighth century CE. The text serves as a guide for moral 
development instructing readers on how to become a bodhisattva through the cultivation of the 
six pāramitās, the process by which one generates and maintains bodhicitta. Jay Garfield argues 
in his “What is it Like to be a Bodhisattva?” that this path is best understood as a path of moral 
phenomenological transformation and that Śāntideva’s text is a treatise on the distinction 
between the phenomenologies of benighted and of awakened moral consciousness.129  
The text is structured in a particular order for the practitioner to follow and includes 
instructions on developing and maintaining the six Mahāyāna pāramitās. Śāntideva also 
mentions two degrees of bodhicitta, first, at the outset of moral development one is to cultivate 
aspirational bodhicitta, the serious intention to cultivate one’s moral capacities and lead an 
awakened life, second, engaged bodhicitta, the set of spontaneous moral perceptual skills and 
dispositions that lead one to act in beneficial ways.130 Both degrees are mental aspects that 
deeply concern the intention and motivation behind one’s actions, both in regards to oneself and 
others. 
Much of the text concerns aspirational bodhicitta with Śāntideva considering how to 
nurture this attitude in the beginning chapters. He then turns to the development of concentration 
necessary for maintaining introspective awareness regarding one’s motivational and affective 
states, then to the cultivation of patience and the energy for ethical practice.131 The chapters on 
developing generosity, moral discipline, patience, and vigor are written so as to show how one 
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can see the world in different, less maladaptive, ways. For example the chapter on patience 
instructs the reader on the unwholesomeness of anger in particular and recommends ways of 
viewing one’s anger so as to counteract it as it arises. In verse twenty-two Śāntideva states,  
I feel no anger towards bile and the like, even though they cause intense suffering. Why 
am I angry with the sentient? They too have reasons for their anger.132 
 
Here Śāntideva is offering a way to conceive of a situation in which one is the object of another’s 
anger. Rather than returning the anger with more anger Śāntideva implores the reader to consider 
how we typically do not feel the same type of anger towards illnesses because they arise due to 
some set of particular conditions. We should view the anger of the other person as arising due to 
some set of causes and conditions as well. The intended effect is the dissipation of anger towards 
other sentient beings by contemplating how all things arise due to causes and conditions. This 
type of strategy indicates Śāntideva’s phenomenological approach to moral transformation, and 
how one can consider, and eventually perceive, situations in radically different ways that do not 
engender suffering. These different ways of seeing are reinforced in the later chapters, Garfield 
explains, 
The final chapters of the text address the role of meditation in stabilizing the qualities and 
ways of seeing cultivated earlier, and finally the importance of a particular kind of 
wisdom as the foundation of the engaged bodhicitta that is the foundation of awakened 
life – that is, the ability to see all phenomena – including oneself, that to which one is 
intimately related, and other moral agents – as empty of inherent existence, as 
interdependent and as impermanent.133  
 
Earlier strategies for cultivating the perfections may be cognitive exercises one works through, 
but the perfection of meditation and wisdom aim to solidify these ways into a wholly new way of 
experiencing the world.  
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The perfections elucidated on the bodhisattva path transform the moral psychology of the 
practitioner successively such that each progression informs and deepens further progress. For 
instance, generosity and moral discipline are not merely acts that one does such as feeding the 
poor or following tenets; they are mental states that facilitate progress on the path and contribute 
to a diminishment of suffering (at least) within the practitioner. A generous mind has 
relinquished attachment to worldly possessions so that there is no mental resistance if and when 
the practitioner needs to give up all they have. A morally disciplined practitioner has transformed 
the intention of her mind and has renounced the greed that fuels many worldly concerns.134 
When treated as mental states the cultivation of these perfections places much emphasis on the 
practitioner’s introspective awareness, and her intention from moment to moment. Generally this 
awareness is beneficial for developing the meditative focus that stabilizes these ways of seeing 
within the character of the practitioner. More specifically, the cultivation of generosity may 
further enforce the transitory nature of all phenomena within the mind of the practitioner while 
the cultivation of moral discipline allows for the practitioner to become less distracted from the 
requirements of the path. In this manner the directives on the path are tools that the practitioner 
can utilize to modify their moral psychology in ways that dismantle the attitudes and emotions 
that are associated with suffering, enhancing those that are associated with happiness, and 
prepare the practitioner’s mind for further advancement along the path. 
In the chapter on wisdom Śāntideva indicates the moral importance of the Madhyamaka 
view of metaphysics whereby all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, interdependent, 
and have only conventional identities. For Śāntideva once this view is completely internalized 
then one’s experience, both of oneself and of the world, is fundamentally transformed. The 
suffering that is pervasive to human experience is rooted in the cognitive instinct to take the 
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world and oneself to be substantial, independent, and enduring. Extirpation of this instinct is 
necessary for awakening as well as the complete cessation of suffering and is contingent upon 
philosophical reflection. However, for the practitioner to be receptive to this philosophical 
position she must have cultivated her moral sensibility in ways that loosen the attachment and 
aversion that come with this default instinct.135 This is why Śāntideva’s chapter on wisdom 
comes at the end of the text even though its content forms the foundation of awakened life. 
Moreover, once this point has been reached the practitioner does not merely discard the practices 
and conventions of conventional reality for these constitute the world that the practitioner must 
live within. Knowledge acquired through the use of authoritative epistemic instruments still 
applies within conventional reality and are necessary for successful functioning. A 
thoroughgoing experiential understanding of emptiness does not undermine a bodhisattva’s 
ability to navigate throughout the world, it just undermines the cognitive instinct to take 
conventional phenomena as substantial, enduring, and independent. In this manner the 
bodhisattva sees conventional reality but also sees through conventional reality by understanding 
it as empty, dependently arisen, and conventionally identified.  
In this manner there is a sort of internal justification to the particular practices that 
constitute the path of the bodhisattva. Incitements to cultivate, say, generosity and patience are 
normative because of their particular place within the structure of the path such that they till the 
soil of the practitioner’s mind for the seeds of wisdom presented in the final chapter on prajñā. 
For the Mādhyamika the normativity of the robustly ethical directives and claims that constitute 
the path to awakening comes about through their particular effectiveness in transforming the 
psychology of the practitioner traversing the path. This transformative nature of the path does not 
only facilitate the later stages of the path, but contributes to the diminishment of suffering within 
                                                
135 Garfield, “What is it Like,” 355. 
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the practitioner by dismantling the roots of suffering. In a linguistic sense, the truth of these 
ethical claims is functional along Price’s lines insofar as they express a type of normativity 
focused on a goal. Within Price’s account, and plausibly within conventional reality, there is a 
general assumption that pooled cognitive resources and shared goals are beneficial for 
communities that have the norm of truth. In the more narrow context of the Madhyamaka ethical 
project there is still this normativity attached to truth but robustly ethical claims are focused on a 
more specific goal of successful maneuvering through conventional reality while mitigating 
suffering and progressing towards awakening. Within this context the claim of ethical truth 
means that any claim opposite is regarded as false for the purpose of guiding the practitioner 
(one already within the context of the Madhyamaka ethical project) along the path. Moreover, 
according to the Madhyamaka framework the specific claims regarding generosity, patience, and 
the like are endorsed for their particular effectiveness in helping the practitioner progress along 
the path, and in diminishing her experience of suffering.  
3.5 Objections 
Despite all of this, the approach I am postulating is not without problems. There does not 
seem to be a way to ground the truth of these ethical claims without appealing to the Buddhist 
framework from which they are given. A functional and broadly pragmatist theory of truth may 
certainly be plausible but this does not necessitate one particular ethical view, let alone the 
Buddhist one. Moreover, if the Mādhyamika is correct in asserting that all things are empty and 
without any inherent existence or essence then what is it that makes their worldview and 
approach worth engaging with as opposed to any other? Or more broadly, what could be the 
basis for making any particular claims within conventional reality? These are important 
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questions and I will offer some initial avenues of exploration for the Mādhyamika in facing these 
objections. 
3.5.1 James and Religious Belief 
I have alluded to pragmatism as a source of potential avenues that Madhyamaka could 
exploit in defending particular aspects of their view while maintaining a commitment to 
emptiness, and I think this approach can be utilized to some degree here as well. “The Will To 
Believe” is one of William James’s most popular essays, in it he argues for (among other things) 
the justifiability of holding evidentially unsupported beliefs under certain conditions, as well as 
our passional nature’s ineliminable role in influencing belief. There is a distinction worth noting 
in his essay between the right to believe and the will to believe136, where the former concerns the 
epistemic acceptability of holding certain beliefs, and the latter the psychological tendency to 
hold certain evidentially unsupported beliefs given one’s disposition, socio-cultural background 
etc.  
James provides two formulations of his will to believe doctrine137 the first of which 
comes in section IV,   
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the 
question open,’ is itself a passional decision – just like deciding yes or no – and is 
attended with the same risk of losing truth.138  
 
In this essay James is primarily concerned with religious belief, and in this regard he argues that 
the attitudes we take towards religious matters are not simply governed by evidence, but rather 
                                                
136 Michael Slater emphasizes this distinction in the first chapter of his William James on Ethics and Faith, 
19-47, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
137 Despite the distinction made between the right and will to believe I will continue to refer to James’ 
doctrine as the will to believe doctrine as this is what has been the accepted practice in the relevant literature.  
 
138 William James, The Will To Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 
New York, NY: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1896, 1921, 11. 
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involve a range of contingent psychological and historical factors.139 It is these that James refers 
to as our passional nature and they include (but are not limited to) one’s temperament, personal 
history, culture, tradition, and the society into which one is born.140 In James’s view, since 
religious matters are objectively inconclusive and the above aspects are inexorably bound up 
with rationality, then religious belief is not mainly a rational affair. This is not a cause for 
concern for James as he not only says that our passional nature may influence our decisions of 
belief, but that it must influence these decisions under certain conditions. 
Chief among these conditions is when the options for belief are “genuine options”, which 
James defines as being live, forced, and momentous. For the person making the decision a live 
option is one that is considered credible. That is, the decider considers the option to be a 
possibility for her, given her own particular psychological constitution and history. This lends an 
irreducibly subjective aspect to live options but does not mean they reduce to being merely 
subjective.141 His example is of becoming a theosophist or Muslim;142 both are dead options for 
him in particular but the former may be live for someone else living in late nineteenth-century 
Boston, whereas the second is not. Moreover, some options are irredeemably dead for someone 
despite their desires, history, and socio-cultural background. For instance, I cannot become a 
samurai no matter how attractive I find the notion because this is not a real option for me, or any 
of my contemporaries. Second, a forced option is one that involves an exclusive logical 
disjunction. This does not allow one to abstain from making a decision one way or another. His 
example of choosing to go out with or without an umbrella is decidedly not a forced option 
                                                




141 Ibid, 31. 
 
142 Ibid, 3. 
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because you could just as easily stay inside. However, the decision to accept or reject a truth 
claim is forced because there are only two options. Finally, a momentous option is one that is 
unique, significant, and irreversible in such a way as to mark a major shift in the life of the one 
making the decision. A non-momentous decision is trivial, and most of the decisions we face in 
everyday life are trivial. James even mentions that scientific practice abounds in trivial decisions 
of belief. This is due to the ability of the scientist to discard a hypothesis if experimentation 
shows the corresponding avenue of study to be fruitless. Believing in the existence of an 
Abrahamic god would be a momentous decision because this would presumably entail a large 
shift in the patterns of behavior for one that holds this belief as opposed to one that does not.  
When some belief is evidentially inconclusive and the belief is a genuine option for the 
one making the decision then it is lawful for our passional nature to influence our decision in the 
matter. According to Michael Slater, James’s second formulation comes towards the end of the 
essay,  
In concreto, the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the intellect of 
the individual cannot by itself resolve; and living options never seem absurdities to him 
who has them to consider.143 
 
This notably jettisons the conditions of the decision being forced and momentous. For Slater this 
is a better formulation because the requirement that the decision be forced concerns only the 
logical form of the choice not the actual content. Moreover, the momentousness requirement 
means that religious beliefs must be momentous to be justified, effectively denying the right to 
hold trivial religious beliefs, which seems implausible.144 This being the case, then one can seek 
justification for religious belief if the evidence is inconclusive and if the option is live for the one 
making the decision. This notion is not meant to relieve us of the obligation of evidential 
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144 Slater, William James, 34-35. 
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support; we still have an obligation to attend to the relevant evidence regarding the belief when 
there is evidence available. In addition, it is the evidential inconclusiveness that provides the 
justification for the belief, Slater explains, 
Presumably it is the evidential inconclusiveness of our options which gives us our 
epistemic warrant, and the liveness or deadness of the options which, according to our 
passional nature, guides our decision to believe one option rather than another.145 
 
Slater remarks that this is not necessarily what James himself thought of the matter, but that this 
is a defensible interpretation, especially when distinguishing the epistemic right to believe and 
the psychological will to believe.  
3.5.2 Buddhist Application  
If the proper justification of religious belief comes through the absence or 
inconclusiveness of evidence then the core doctrines of Buddhism must be evidentially 
inconclusive if the Mādhyamika is to utilize this approach. It seems unlikely that universally 
compelling evidence will obtain for or against the reality of the self, for the fundamental 
impermanence of conventional reality, or, more directly, for the universal emptiness of all 
phenomena. Since these metaphysical claims seem to be beyond the scope of empirical support 
then it seems plausible that such a belief could be justified in the manner that James describes. 
However, this does not necessarily answer the objection above. One may be justified in choosing 
to adopt Buddhism given the evidential inconclusiveness but this does not tell us why one would 
or should do so.  
The potential answer to this lies in the psychology of the one faced with the decision. As 
James mentions, the passional nature will incline us toward or away from certain options, and 
our personal histories and dispositions will determine the liveness or deadness of such options. 
This matter has an irreducibly subjective aspect to it and will vary across a population. If this is 
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 85 
the case then not everyone will find the basic claims of Buddhism compelling. For example, 
those never exposed to Buddhist thought and brought up in a thoroughgoing Catholic tradition 
may not necessarily find the claims within Buddhism compelling. Or, if such a person does find 
certain claims compelling, say that of the ubiquity of suffering, then he may disagree on the best 
way to remedy the situation, or on whether the situation needs to be remedied at all. On the other 
hand, if one has neutral or lukewarm metaphysical commitments, intellectually appreciates the 
Buddhist explanation of suffering and its ubiquity, and recognizes a need to diminish suffering in 
one’s own life, then the option for belief in the Buddhist framework is quite live. 
Tsongkhapa’s The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment146 supports 
this psychological aspect where he talks of three types of motivation to enter onto the path. The 
first motivation is to merely obtain favorable rebirths for oneself. One is not concerned with 
escaping saṃsāra but rather merely “getting a leg up” within the cyclic existence. The second 
motivation is disenchantment with cyclic existence and the desire for peace through one’s own 
liberation from saṃsāra. The third describes those who sincerely wish to extinguish the suffering 
of all sentient creatures through the understanding of their own suffering. These motivations are 
described in terms of increasing capacity or merit with the third being superlative. The first two 
have one’s own wellbeing as the prime motivation to embark upon the path, whereas the third is 
fundamentally concerned with all creatures. Despite this graduated classification Tsongkhapa 
goes on to say that all scriptures and teachings cater to all three, and even if one may already be 
motivated by the suffering of others one should still cultivate the first two motivations so as to 
affectively benefit oneself in the cultivation and maintenance of great compassion.147 
                                                
146 Tsongkhapa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Lam Rim Chen Mo Vol. 1, 
trans. The Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee, eds. Joshua W.C. Cutler and Guy Newland, (Boston: Snow 
Lion, 2000) 129-142. 
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Tsongkhapa’s point is that various psychological factors may drive someone to pursue the path 
but they can all be transmuted into the great compassion that characterizes the bodhisattva. 
Moreover, he is giving explicit examples of psychological dispositions that would help make the 
Buddhist path a live option in a manner similar to what James describes. Tsongkhapa describes 
the first motivation as merely aspiring for favorable rebirths, but in this context where rebirth is 
assumed this amounts to a basic self-interest. If this is the case then he seems to cast the net quite 
wide to include most people who would hold at least a primitive form of self-interest.  
The Buddhist tradition also places importance on the role of exemplars in motivation for 
pursuing the path. In the legendary account of the Siddhartha Gautama’s life before he was the 
Buddha he was a noble prince who lived a life of splendor and luxury. When Gautama was born 
his father had received omens that his son would be either a great king or renounce worldly life 
entirely. Because of this his father kept him cloistered within the palace walls surrounded in a 
life of worldly pleasure. Gautama left the palace for the first time when he was twenty-nine, and 
came across four sights that profoundly impacted him. The first was an old man, and when 
Gautama asked his charioteer about this (he had been surrounded by beauty and youth his whole 
life) the charioteer responded that this was something that happened to all beings. The second 
sight was an ill person suffering from disease. Again Gautama asked and the charioteer said that 
all beings are subject to sickness and pain. The third sight was of a dead body, once again 
Gautama asked the charioteer and again he replied that this fate befalls everyone. Gautama was 
deeply troubled by these sights when they came across the fourth, an ascetic monk who had 
withdrawn from the world. The ascetic seemed to be quite content despite the afflictions of the 
world around him. This gave Gautama the hope that there was a way to address the suffering that 
he had just been exposed to, and it was this sight that convinced him to renounce his princely life 
                                                                                                                                                       
147 Ibid, 134-35. 
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and become an ascetic himself. He joined a group of ascetics and quickly mastered the 
meditation techniques they offered but found no answer to the fundamental problem of suffering 
so he left them seeking more understanding. He tried more extreme methods of disciplining his 
body through fasting and extremely austere living but this only served to make him ill and he 
realized that this path would lead to death rather than answers. He sat beneath a fig tree and 
resolved to attain what he was searching for until several days later he had what is described as 
an awakening experience. Afterwards he returned to the group of ascetics that he initially joined 
to try to explain what he had learned and they were struck by the change in his demeanor. It was 
the change they sensed in him that was chiefly responsible for their receptiveness in listening to 
his message, and so he formed the first saṃgha or community of Buddhist monks. 
Both the fourth sight of the ascetic and Gautama’s own appearance to his former 
companions are examples of the psychological effect of exemplars on behavior within 
Buddhism’s origin story. The fourth sight of the ascetic serves as a particularly strong exemplar 
especially given Gautama’s heightened sensitivity towards suffering after witnessing the first 
three sights. It is this sight that shows Gautama a way out of the mire of existential suffering that 
he is experiencing, and so contributes to his journey of awakening. When the Buddha met with 
his former companions he was the exemplar, and it was the change they sensed in him that led to 
their acceptance of his teaching. Moreover, within many types of Buddhist practice there is an 
emphasis placed on the relationship between student and teacher that I think is at least partly 
explained by the psychological effect of exemplars on motivation. Although not the only 
function, the teacher serves to show what is possible from cultivation on the Buddhist path, 
thereby inciting the practitioner to maintain and persist her development.   
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Psychological factors seem to explain the other concern regarding following a particular 
Buddhist path, say that of the Mahāyāna, among many others. One may be convinced of the 
Buddha’s message regarding the ubiquity of suffering but be drawn to different traditions within 
Buddhism and this is the result of the passional nature of the individual in question. It is a 
contingent matter whether one was first exposed to Mahāyāna thought or non-Mahāyāna thought 
when entering into the Buddhist framework. Within this framework a Mādhyamika may offer 
some reasons for the particular potency of their approach to the Buddhist path, but again in the 
absence of objective evidential support it is a matter of the practitioner’s psychological 
disposition whether or not the practitioner will accept this conception of the path to awakening. 
The manifold arguments made by prominent Mādhyamikas (Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, Śāntideva 
etc) serve to convince those of the rational nature of Madhyamaka. However, if we take James 
quite seriously then there is no such thing as unadulterated rationality because our reasoning and 
rational faculties are shot through with subjective and passional factors. He states in section III 
that, “…pure insight and logic, whatever they might do ideally, are not the only things that really 
do produce our creeds.”148 And in section VI, “Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless 
very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream visited planet are they 
found?”149 For James belief is a jointly rational, passional, and volitional affair150, but this does 
not mean that we can bring ourselves to believe anything we wish.151 Once again, for James there 
is an irreducibly subjective and passional nature to our belief formation. It seems though that this 
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151 James himself gives the example of believing that the sum of two one-dollar bills is one hundred dollars. 
This is something that we can say but we are impotent to believe it because there is direct evidence that bears on the 
belief. See James, Will to Believe, 5. 
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works in favor for the Mādhyamika interlocutor, at least insofar as he is addressing one already 
within the framework of Buddhism. It seems plausible that such a practitioner is more apt to 
accept rational arguments from another Buddhist given some of the commitments that they 
already share. Moreover, if we take the explanation of Śāntideva’s path to awakening as one of 
moral psychological transformation structured in a specific way, then the rational arguments that 
come at the end of his BCA are intended for one who has prepared her mind to accept them. This 
preparation is a volitional alteration of one’s passional nature such that one is more inclined to 
believe the arguments that follow.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The problem with which I have been grappling is not a product of recent philosophical 
engagement with Madhyamaka. The claim of universal emptiness has been interpreted as a form 
of nihilism since opponents began to engage with the Madhyamaka philosophical approach. 
Disentangling and articulating the Madhyamaka position is a step to avoiding such 
mischaracterizations, and was what occupied me in the first chapter. There we saw that the 
support that Abhidharma gives to their truth claims is the result of correspondence between the 
claims themselves and ultimate reality. Part of what Madhyamaka does is to jettison this 
foundational metaphysical ontology, and with it the Abhidharma manner of justification for truth 
claims. Without this resource the Mādhyamika is in need of a way to support their claims while 
maintaining the commitment to emptiness that signifies their position. Moreover, the 
abandonment of ultimate reality leaves the Madhyamaka ontology concerned entirely with 
conventional reality. Within Abhidharma ultimate reality is foundational and knowledge of it is 
that which facilitates awakening, whereas conventional reality is that which obscures this 
knowledge. For the Mādhyamika conventional reality is all that there could be and Nāgārjuna 
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even makes the claim that it is through knowledge of conventional truth that ultimate truth is 
realized.152 So the Mādhyamika is in need of providing some sort of grounding or justification 
for the ethical claims that they put forth without any sort of foundational appeal to an ultimate 
reality. 
 Without providing some sort of normative weight then Madhyamaka faces the crippling 
problem of the dismal slough. This characterization, coined by Tom Tillemans, concerns truth 
claims within Madhymaka philosophy. Candrakīrti, mentions an approach to truth that takes the 
opinion of the world as the sole criterion which determines truth. This position is derivable from 
claims made within Nāgārjuna’s MMK and as such seems to be a problem that Madhyamaka 
needs to address. For Tillemans this approach to truth will inevitably lead to unreliability and 
extreme relativism; the former because all opinions, even those of experts, can be unreliable in 
some situations, the latter because there would be no fact of the matter to establish truth if truth 
is merely the opinions that some population holds. This completely undermines epistemology by 
removing any meaningful distinction between truth and falsity, but it is also harmful for ethical 
claims by significantly blurring the distinction between good and bad conduct.  
 This is the problem the Mādhyamika needs to address, especially since the Buddhist path 
is one that is so primarily concerned with the actions one takes to achieve a particular valued 
outcome. My approach in this chapter has been to consider ethical truth as a subset of truth 
generally, and since Madhyamaka is primarily concerned with conventional truth I began with an 
articulation of conventional truth drawing on Huw Price’s functional approach to truth. Price’s 
account is metaphysically deflationist in one sense but realist in another, and is concerned with 
what truth does for a community that operates with it in their language. Essentially he views it as 
                                                
152 MMK 24:8-10. The lack of ultimate reality does not exclude the existence of at least one ultimate truth 
for Madhyamaka – emptiness. This truth is ultimate in a soteriological sense due to its importance in the awakening 
of the one who has fully understood and implemented it. 
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a norm that engenders actual dialogue through the incitement of disagreement with those whom 
hold contrary claims. Dialogue is postulated as important because Price assumes (rightly I think) 
that shared goals and pooled cognitive resources are generally beneficial and that they arise only 
through the successful application of dialogue within a community of language users. 
 This seems a suitable option for the Mādhyamika due its deflationist aspect and its focus 
on the normativity of truth. We can consider conventional truth in Madhyamaka as operating in a 
similar way. Truth is best analyzed not metaphysically but functionally and serves to direct us 
into dialogue with each other, with the promise of beneficial cooperation in the end. In chapter 
one I characterized conventional truth as similar to traffic laws insofar as they are arbitrary in 
one sense but serve a purpose to get commuters efficiently to their destinations while reducing 
collisions. I think this analogy is telling and conventional truth operates much like this with the 
general function being efficient maneuvering through the world.  
This is supported by traditional Buddhist epistemology, which concerns (like all classical 
Indian epistemology) instruments of knowledge and objects of knowledge. For Dharmakīrti 
perception and inference are the only two accepted instruments of knowledge and their 
acceptability lies in their nondeceptiveness. This nondeceptiveness is understood primarily 
through the expected causal effects of an object. This practical or reliability criterion seems to 
run through Buddhist epistemology and Nāgārjuna indicates an approach whereby instruments of 
knowledge and objects of knowledge mutually reinforce each other. This process is explained to 
be a type of coherence between objects of knowledge and instruments of knowledge such that 
neither is foundational and the whole process is fallible and revisable. Experience dictates which 
instruments of knowledge yield valid objects of knowledge, which help refine instruments of 
knowledge and so on. The whole process takes nothing as robustly foundational and can be 
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adjusted as experience presents certain instrument-object pairings as more or less efficacious in 
facilitating successful maneuvering through conventional reality.  
If ethical truth is a subset of truth then it is plausible that this approach will be similar to 
how ethical truth operates. Ethical truth retains the same normative function component 
exhibited in Price and mainstream Buddhist epistemology but the function here is a narrower 
one. The Mādhyamika retains the authoritative cognition of conventional truths, which provide 
an effective way to maneuver through conventional reality, but in addition the ethical claims of 
Madhyamaka serve to help the practitioner mitigate suffering and achieve awakening. Ethical 
truth is normatively loaded in a pragmatic manner because of the particular structure of the 
Mahāyāna path toward awakening. When understood as a path of moral psychological 
transformation the Mahāyāna path serves to change the moral experience of the practitioner. The 
end result is a different and more beneficial way of being in the world that is more morally 
sensitive and effectively responsive to moral situations. Ethical truth then would be those truths 
that normatively guide the practitioner toward awakening due to their particular effectiveness in 
moral transformation within the Madhyamaka framework. Ethical falsity would be those claims 
that prevent or obstruct this moral transformation of the Mādhyamika. The Buddhist concept of 
upāya-kauśalya, “skillful means” captures this notion well despite how it is not necessarily 
employed in this particular context. Originally it applied to the pedagogical skill of the Buddha, 
as he would adjust his teaching to meet the disposition and spiritual advancement of particular 
audiences; asserting something in one context that he may not in another. What was asserted was 
dependent upon what would best suit the spiritual advancement of the audience. This is similar to 
Price’s metaphysical deflation of truth and consequent elevation of the functional role of truth. 
Here then the Madhyamaka notion of ethical truth is a type of upāya insofar as it serves to 
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advance the progress of the practitioner while maintaining the emptiness of the claims being 
made.  
I mentioned that the primary problem for this approach is its internally directed nature. 
Normativity is supplied to ethical claims because of the claimed practical efficacy of these 
claims in moral transformation. Moreover, if such emptiness is really this pervasive then what 
can the Mādhyamika offer as reason to follow the path? Religious and philosophical systems 
typically orbit around certain metaphysical claims and Buddhism is no different. These claims 
are evidentially unsupported because they are either not of the nature to be evidentially supported 
or there is no evidence for or against them. For William James this evidential inconclusiveness 
along with the particular passional nature of some individual is what justifies the religious or 
philosophical belief of that individual. So in this sense one can justify one’s adherence to a 
Buddhist worldview as long as the distinctly Buddhist claims are not evidentially supported, and 
one’s passional nature has made the Buddhist worldview a live option for that person. This 
particular matter is contingent upon that particular person’s psychology, yet this the 
psychological aspect of James’s will to believe doctrine. Since the Mādhyamika is loathe to 
assert some sort of inherent essence in any domain then it seems she will need to accept this sort 
of contingency regarding the acceptance of the Buddhist framework. Similarly, one’s psychology 
would play a pivotal role in the acceptance of the distinctly Madhyamaka variety of Buddhism. 
Yet if one is already within the Buddhist framework then it seems plausible that one would be 
more inclined to accept Madhyamaka given the shared commitments that span Buddhism at 
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